German battle style in ultra mobile, high intensity war: North African Desert 1941-42 by Stolfi, Russel H. S.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
1991
German battle style in ultra mobile, high
intensity war: North African Desert 1941-42
Stolfi, Russel H. S.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/44198





GERMAN BATTLE STYLE 
IN ULTRA MOBILE, HIGH INTENSITY WAR: 
NORTH AFRICAN DESERT 1941-42 
BY 
PROF. DR. RUSSEL H. S. STOLFI 
U.S. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
MONTEREY, CA 93943 











Preface ----------------------------- Page iii 
Introduction------------------------------ x 
Rommel------------------------------------ 1 
German Style in Mobile War---------------- 20 
Operational and Tactical 
Observations on the German 
Conduct of War in the Desert-------------- 36 
German Logistics in the Desert ----------- 76 
German Staffs: Competent, Small, 
Modestly Ranked, Action Oriented---------- 86 
Mobile War in the Desert: 
Conclusions and Applications-------------- 99 
Figures 
Rommel's Signature on Panzer Group Order 
of 9 Sep 41. Note the Initials of German 
General Staff Officers Above and Below -------- xix 
Kampfgruppe Bismarck (15, 16 Mar 42) -------- 27 
15th Panzer Division, OAK, Panzer 
Army Africa, 3 Jan 42: the Ib (Quarter-
master) and the Division Trains --------------- 79 
The General Staff-Style Positions in 
15th Panzer Division (Feb 42) ----------------- 95 
1. North Africa Around - Agedabia. Map is 
Original German Situation Map of 
20-25 Jan 42 ---------------------------------------xvii 
2. North Africa Around Tobruk. Map is original 
German Situation Map of 25 Nov 41 -----------------xviii 
3. Planned German Attack on Tobruk (Late Nov 41). 
Note Thrust Line. ---------------------------------- 19 
ii 
PREFACE 
The German Army fought battles in World Wars I and II more 
effectively than any other armed force. Other great Armies 
British, French, American, and Russian - - fought against the 
Germans with estimable battle fighting skill among commanders and 
combat soldiers. Those Armies also fought with weapons similar 
in technological performance characteristics to those of the 
Germans. The German Army, however, linked tactics and operations 
with 
we, p r, 
in combinations that gave it more impressive 
victories on the strategic offensive and dangerous vigor on the 
strategic defensive than its respected opponents. The German 
Army possessed an edge in war fighting that remains to this day 
difficult to qualify but nevertheless a tangible, superiority 
over the other great Armies of the world. This brief study 
searches for in~ights into what made the German Army tick: the 
style of the commanders and the spirit that drove the combat 
soldiers. The purpose of the study is to present the insights 
and make recommendations on how the associated German style of 
fighting might be applied to improve U. s. Marine Corps opera-
tions today. 
The thesis that the German Army fought armed battles more 
effectively than any of its opponents demands at least brief 
elaboration. In the years of sweeping social and economic change 
preceding World War I, the German Army developed the most impres-
sive plan of military operations for possible war between the two 
opposing alliance systems that had developed between 1890-1914. 
The plans for military operations of the four other Great Powers 
iii 
that entered the war in 1914, do not remotely approach Count 
Alfred von Schlieffen's conceptualization in terms of boldness, 
decisiveness, initiative, concentration, and surprise - - factors 
that read like a litany of the possible principles of war. In 
the words of probably the most distinguished living historical 
authority on Germany, the Germans intended to put the armed 
strength of a great power (France), as it were, like a cat in a 
bag. 1 Just as impressive, the Germans intended then to transfer 
the victorious armies to the denuded eastern front and put an 
even bigger Russian cat in a (presumably) bigger bag. The German 
operations at the beginning of World War I associated with the 
ideas of Schlieffen reflect, in turn, the tangible German superi-
ority in operations and tactics for the rest of the war. 
The operations conducted by Helmut von Moltke (the Younger) 
in August-September 1914 and associated with the earlier 
Schlieffen ''Plan" would fail to conquer France or take Paris. 
This failure is well known. The opening German offensive gained 
so much ground, however, that the Germans fought for the next 
~ 
four years exclusively on French and Belg~ soil. This astound-
ing general framework for the entire war in the west is rarely 
connected with the Schlieffen "Plan" and seldom claimed as a 
factor in support of German operational prowess in World War I. 
On the eastern front, the Germans conducted the most effective 
set of military operations in the entire war in the Battle of 
Tannenberg (August 1914) and its sequel. The Germans went on 
1. Gordon A. Craig, Stanford University, in various conversations 
with the author between 1965 and the present. 
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with t~e help of a faltering but casualty-absorbing Austro-
Hungarian Empire to defeat Russia by December 1917. German 
expeditionary armies with deceptive ease would knock Serbia 
(1915) and Rumania (1916) out of the Great War. Modest German 
forces assisting the Austrians in the south would inflict in late 
1917 the most serious defeat of the Italians in the war. The 
Germans would excel in gas warfare notably artillery projectile 
tactics and technology and the employment of mustard gas, the 
employment of machine guns, the construction of fortifications, 
and the development of "shock troop tactics. 112 
Struck by the picture above, historical authorities have 
quantified the relative effectiveness of the armies in World War 
I. Authorities have used casualties inflicted and received by 
each side in a battle as the most important unit of exchange in 
the business of war. Casualty data have been available since the 
modern more systematic approach to war that emerged in the 
nineteenth century. Authorities have been able to extract these 
data from medical and adjutant general (personnel administration) 
records of the larger European armies. These data correlated 
with the personnel strengths of the opposing forces in a battle 
and numerical factors to account for inherent advantages associ-
ated with the side on the defensive, have been used to score the 
effectiveness of the opposing sides in battle. Using the data as 
sketched out above and assigning scores, authorities note that 
2. Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the 
German Army 1914-1918 (New York, 1989), is a recent 
account of the tactics that were the forerunner of the blitz 
style of advance in World War II. 
v 
two German soldiers in World War I were equivalent in "combat 
effectiveness" to three western allied soldiers, for example, 
French or British. On the eastern front, the combat effective-
ness equations indicate that two German soldiers were the equiva-
lent of approximately 14 Russians. 3 The effectiveness scores are 
tied in closely with casualties and these numbers can be general-
ized roughly as telling the reader that when the Germans received 
two casualties on the western front they inflicted three and when 
they received two casualties in the east they inflicted 14. 
These numbers suggest the importance of attempting to discover 
what made the Germans tick in war fighting. 
In World War II, the German Army conducted operations from 
1939-1941 that gave it the immediate possibility of winning the 
war in Europe through continuation of the drive on Moscow in 
August 1941. The Army fought under difficult operational circum-
stances in Norway and the Balkans, was significantly outnumbered 
in men and tanks in the French Campaign, and faced the challenge 
of a two-front war in the Polish Campaign that demanded an imme-
diate victory on the "eastern front." The German Army conducted 
the fighting in those campaigns with a style of operational moves 
so bold that it achieved victories in the immediate opening 
stages of the campaigns. In effect, during the period, the 
Germans won the opening stages of "campaigns'' rather than cam-
paigns as conventionally understood in the sense of the later 
ponderous North African, Italian, and Northwestern European 
"P 
,~ 1 3. Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, USA (Ret.), Numbers, iredictions and ~~ar (London, 1979), pp. 99-103. 
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campaigns of the western allies. The style of command and the 
methods of combat required to win so quickly and decisively 
characterized German war fighting on the strategic offensive. 
On the strategic defensive from late 1942-1945, the German 
Army put on impressive performances in the three major theaters 
of the war in Europe. In the Mediterranean, the German Army won 
a defensive "victory" in Sicily, avoiding destruction, inflicting 
heavy casualties and escaping across water with personnel and 
equipment. In Italy, the Germans similarly won a great defensive 
victory punishing stronger allied forces in costly battles around 
Salerno, Ortona, Cassino, and Anzio and preventing the seizure of 
Northern Italy until the last days of the war. In Northwestern 
Europe, the Germans would put up strong resistance at Normandy, 
defeat the allies in Operation Market Garden, and surprise them 
in the Ardennes offensive with damaging consequences. On the 
eastern front, the Germans would recover from the Stalingrad 
debacle so effectively as to launch a strategic offensive at 
Kursk in July 1943 and prevent the Soviets from reaching the 
fringes of the core German area until early 1945. The German 
Army would fight with vigor on the defensive in a style charac-
terized by self confidence and flexibility in command and tacti-
cal coherence and counterattack esprit on the part of the combat 
troops. 
The Battle of Kursk illustrates the tactical dominance of 
the German Army on the battlefield in World War II. The Soviets 
have continued to view the battle as the centerpiece of the Great 
Fatherland War and the best example of their war fighting skill. 
The battle can scarcely be criticized from the viewpoint of 
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favoring the Germans as a selection for illustrating German war 
fighting skill. The Germans would fight the battle under circum-
stances so adverse that only superior tactical performance on the 
part of the combat troops and commanders would save the Germans 
from a military collapse in the east in 1943. 
The Germans conceptualized the attack in early 1943 at the 
correct time to inflict a strategic setback to the Soviets by the 
destruction of the Soviet forces around Kursk in the strategical-
ly predominate southern front of that year in the war. Through 
the epic procrastination of Adolf Hitler in delaying the attack 
from April to July 1943, the German Army gave the Soviets three 
months to regain their composure from their substantial def eat at 
Kharkov in March that had resulted from disastrous overextension 
at the end of the Stalingrad and Middle Don operations. The 
Soviets would know where the attack was coming for three months, 
construct fortifications to a depth of 35 km, and lay half a 
million mines in belts among them. The Soviets would mass men, 
tanks, artillery, and aircraft in numbers greater than those of 
the attacking Germans. Thanks to Hitler's procrastination, 
British warnings through breaking of the German Enigma codes, and 
Soviet intelligence, the Soviets would even eventually know the 
day of the attack. The Germans would finally launch their attack 
into a summer thunderstorm system that would drench the ground 
and independently of Soviet resistance halt German movement for 
about eight hours early in the offensive. Under such conditions, 
the German Army should have taken disastrous casualties and tank 
losses, gained no ground, and experienced encirclement by the 
viii 
vast Soviet strategic reserve massed for the battle and facing 
immobilized German attackers. 
Authorities have examined this battle and using both Soviet 
and German data have been calculated factors of effectiveness for 
the two sides. The famed Obyon sector was the area where the 
crucial engagement was played out. In that sector, the German 
48th Panzer Corps engaged numerically superior Soviet forces 
organized into the Sixth Guards Army and First Tank Army and set 
in 35-kilometer deep prepared defenses. The Germans achieved a 
score effectiveness in the resultant combat that translates into 
one German combat soldier having the effectiveness of approxi-
mately three Soviet. The 48th Panzer Corps attacked outnumbered 
in tanks and assault guns, artillery pieces, and air support 
sorties by factors in each case of approximately 2:1. The German 
force advanced 35 km into the Soviet positions inflicting approx-
imately 23,400 casualties and knocking out 450 tanks while suf-
fering the loss of 4,400 men and 141 tanks. 4 How is it possible 
that the 48th Panzer Corps could have accomplished these tactical 
results under the burden of the conditions noted? This study is 
part of a continuing search for the style, spirit, and weapons 
that gave the German Army the tactical and operational edge it 
held in World War II, even, for example, when engaged in what the 
Soviets consider their master operation of the War. The search 
now takes us to Rommel and the North African desert. 
4. See these data in Dupuy, Numbers, Predictions and War (1979), 
pp. 108, 109. 
ix 
INTRODUCTION 
In North Africa in January 1941, the Italian Army stood on 
the brink of defeat and the loss of the last Italian territory in 
Africa to a motorized, well equipped and growing British field 
army. British forces stood near El Agheila on the Sirte Gulf 
half the distance from the Egyptian border to Tripoli, the capi-
tal of Libya lying a moderate distance from the Tunisian border. 
Faced with impending Italian collapse, the German High Command 
(OKW) 5 sent a minuscule motorized force to stiffen Italian de-
fenses around El Agheila and prevent, or at least slow, a British 
advance to Tripoli. The OKW designated the force, German Africa 
Corps (DAK), 6 formed it on 9 February 1941, and saw to the arriv-
al of its new commander, Generalleutnant Erwin Rommel 7 on 12 
February. The OKW initially allotted to the Corps one panzer and 
one light division in process of being formed from parts of other 
German divisions in Europe. During the period of this study 1941 
- June 1942, the OAK would comprise two panzer divisions and one 
roughly pieced together light Africa division. 8 
5. Oberkommando der Wehrmacht or OKW. 
6. Deutsches Afrika Korps or OAK. 
7. Rank equivalent to U.S. major general. 
8. 15th Panzer Division in process of formation February 1941 
largely from 33rd Infantry Division. 21st Panzer Division formed 
on basis of 5th Light Division and transformed into the panzer 
division on 1 August 1941 in Africa. A motorized division in 
process of formation early in 1941 out of a melange of German 
units in Europe and Africa. In November 1941, the Germans desig-
nated the ''Africa Division" as 90th Light Africa Division. 
x 
Between February - June 1941, Rommel and the still assem-
bling OAK would dominate the fighting in North Africa. In March 
1941, in a bold counterstroke, disregarding his instructions to 
defend and consolidate around El Agheila, Rommel would advance 
with a handful of German units a distance of 500 miles (along the 
sea) to Sollum on the Egyptian frontier. In June 1941, in con-
junction with numerically strong Italian forces, Rommel and the 
OAK would repulse the British offensive designated Operation 
Battleaxe. The British High Command in the Middle East, pressed 
by the home government, launched the offensive with the optimis-
tic intention of destroying the axis forces now concentrated 
between Tobruk and Sollum in Northeastern Libya. on 15 August 
1941, OKW established Panzergruppe Afrika (Panzer Group Africa) 
and German success and prestige forced a reluctant Italian High 
Command to place virtually all of its field forces in Libya under 
the operational command of recently promoted General der Panzerl-
f ruppen Rommel. 9 Between August - November 1941, Rommel received 
enough reinforcements from Europe to put together the 21st Panzer 
Division and the 90th Light Africa Division. With these forces 
in place, the stage is set to examine the performance of a tal-
ented German commander and several German mobile divisions in 
action against a powerful, well equipped British field army. 
The researcher of this piece chose the German forces in 
North Africa not only for the skill of their operations but also 
for the fact of the desert terrain. For the past approximately 
20 years, the U. S. Armed Forces have been increasingly 
9. German rank equivalent to U.S. lieutenant general. 
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preoccupied with the necessity to provide advice and weapons to 
countries faced with realistic prospects of high intensity con-
ventional war in the desert. These countries include an unlikely 
assortment of very different states having, however, the common 
striking characteristic of desert climate and terrain. The 
countries comprise Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. 
During the same time, the U. s. Armed Forces have faced realistic 
possibilities of intervention against hostile states in the same 
band of climate and terrain to include Libya and Iraq. The 
desert places a premium on mobility in terms of weapons, organi-
zation, and the style of command. With its historical experience 
almost exclusively of set piece heavy infantry assault against 
fortified areas and light infantry combat in jungle covered moun-
tain and rice paddy, the Marine Corps cannot be said to have the 
weapons, organization, and command style that suggest an easy 
transition to mobile war in .......... . 
r:-avo,..,~r 
terrai~ ....... a motor-
ized enemy. The Marine Corps is aware of the stronger possibili-
ties of having to move over long distances against mobile, ar-
mored opponent5 and has exercised forces in the California desert 
in order to make adjustments possible within the constraints of 
effective strategic mobility. Rommel and the OAK conducted 
military operations in similar terrain with a style that the 
Marine Corps should know because the Germans operated with 
superior technique, parts of which can be applied to Marine Corps 
operations today. 
Since 1945, British historical opinion has gone through 
several phases on the subject of Rommel and the DAK in North 
Africa. A small German force that by most accounts should have 
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been pushed aside and destroyed along with the Italian army in 
Libya by the summer of 1941, in fact, survived the year and came 
close to defeating the British in the summer of 1942. Roughly 
handled psychologically by the German superiority in ground 
warfare, the British have had a natural tendency to seek argu-
an 
ments that protect ............ 11111!!~ image of British excellence in 
arms. Instead of acknowledging that the British field army had 
been outfought by a German commander of genius with a small but 
qualitatively superior corps, British commentators developed 
arguments that tended to protect the image of the British army in 
North Africa as being at least as good as the Germans. Three 
protective arguments predominate: first, Rommel was a military 
genius, and a German corps no more able than the opposing British 
army gained more prestige than it deserved in the fighting in 
1941-1942; then, Rommel was, to the contrary, not a genius but 
the product of historical misrepresentation, and German success 
was based on implied "unfair" technological superiority against 
which a British army qualitatively equal in all other ways to the 
Germans struggled manfully and triumphed; and most recently, 
Rommel again became accepted as a leader of military genius, but 
German technological superiority carried the palm as the predomi-
nate reason for the German success of 1941-42. 
For purposes of this study, the above situation can be 
dispensed with as follows. Rommel can be accurately interpreted 
as a commander of genius. The OAK can be considered to be tangi-
bly superior to the British field army opposing it in command and 
combat soldier style. The OAK cannot be considered to have had a 
significant technological superiority over the British-Imperial 
xiii 
forces. The British argument of technological superiority is 
also a non sequitur, i.e., a reasoning from false or irrelevant 
premises, when used as it has been to protect the image of the 
British fighting man by claiming a non-human deficiency in the 
performance characteristics of the British 2-pounder (40mm} tank 
and antitank guns10 and associated crusader main battle tank. 
The argument fails because even if British technology was inferi-
or, the human leadership element in the body of British fighting 
men stands indicted as less effective than the German because the 
British leaders developed and accepted into the army inferior 
weapons. 
The British field army, nevertheless, stands as superbly 
tenacious, well equipped by any standards, numerically superior 
to the Italo-German forces in virtually every category of weapon 
and equipment, and numerically superior in the air. At sea, the 
British were overwhelming, seriously inhibited only by the incon-
sistent intervention of modest German Stuka (dive bomber) forces. 
Against this first class opponent, Rommel and the DAK , with the 
support of numerically strong but badly equipped Italian divi-
sions, successfully defended eastern Libya in the extended period 
from February 1941-July 1942. In the latter month, Rommel and 
the DAK actually forced the British back to El Alamein, a scant 
55 miles from Alexandria and now over 2,000 miles along the sea 
from Tripoli. The period is filled with examples of gunfire and 
maneuver in the desert. Many of the examples contain lessons 
10. The projectile fired by these guns weighed approximately two 
pounds. 
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that can be applied to Marine Corps tactics, organization, and 
weapons today especially under conditions of mobile war in the 
desert. 
The author was limited to three months for the research, 
writing, and presentation and discussion of results. Faced with 
these constraints, he determined to concentrate on the period 
from 18 November 1941 - 21 June 1942 and the three major engage-
ments within it: 
North Africa, Major Actions, Nov 41 - Jun 42 
1. British crusader Offensive from the Egyptian Frontier, 
18 November 41. 
2. German Counterstroke from El Agheila, 21 January 42. 
3. German Venezia Offensive Around Gazala, 26 May 42. 
In extracting actions and making observations, the author 
determined to use original sources as exemplified by the records 
of the German Army for the period. In a lengthy process begun 
before the actual research, he ordered the most pertinent, opera-
tionally oriented records of the High Command, Panzer Army Africa 
(Armee Oberkommando, Panzerarmee Afrika) and the three German 
divisions in it during the period of study: 15th Panzer Divi-
I 
sion, 21st Panzer Division and 90th LJght Africa Division. The 
author selected 22 reels of the most relevant records for pur-
poses of observing German combat operations. In completing the 
research, the author scanned approximately 14,000 pages of German 
language material. Out of those pages, he reproduced approxi-
mately 1,200 pages that he examined in detail. The study is 
based, therefore, almost exclusively on German records of the 
xv 
African based divisions and Rommel's headquarters. The records 
are supplemented as appropriate by the author's knowledge of the 
published material on the subject based on intermittent but 
considerable attention to the war in Africa since his graduate 
school years at Stanford University in the mid-1960s. 
xvi 
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"You'll find there are always two possible decisions open to 
you. Take the bolder one - - it's always best." Generalleut-
nant Rudolf Schmidt to Rommel in February 1940, on t1ie occasion 
of Rommel taking command of his first Panzer division. 1 
Karl Maria von Clausewitz (1780-1831), erudite Prussian 
philosopher of war, stated, as a result of his search for the 
regulating ideas in war that the best of all possible principles 
in the conduct of war is to do as the genius does. Although he 
seems to be making an obscure witticism, he is probably correct 
in noting that war cannot be conducted by recipe. Military 
leaders, for example, Marine Corps officers cannot conduct war by 
recipes of principles, but neither are many going to be recog-
nized as military geniuses. One way out of this cruel dilemma is 
to encourage the study of war and, as appropriate, the actions of 
geniuses in the realm of armed violence. Rommel was a war fight-
ing genius whose instinctive touch and unexcelled will to exploit 
fleeting opportunity cannot be taught on the one hand or accom-
plished by recipe on the other. The aspiring military leader can 
observe the genius at work by historical study of his actions and 
Col)Sldff'Qf1on 
thoughtful · of his style. Armed with such knowledge, he 
and his armed service should be able to gauge the usefulness of 
the specific techniques of the genius and the possibilities of 
e111t1/at1on ~ 
---------------~----
11. As quoted in David Irving, The Trail of the Fox (London, 
1978)' p. 51. 
1 
Rommel had experienced a uniquely varied and successful 
military career by the time of his entrance into North Africa. 
Born in November 1891 near Ulm in the German Kingdom of Wuerttem-
berg, he grew up in an area of forest and mountain in a state 
where the people are noted for hard headed practicality and 
frugality. Rommel had little natural predilection as an adoles-
newdhe/ @rJJ 
cent for the profession of arms. His fathe7/\placed him in an 
army cadet school in the Prussian port of Danzig on the Baltic 
Sea in July 1910. He was commissioned in 1912 as a lieutenant in 
the Army of Wuerttenberg, one of four German armies that fought 
in World War I. 12 Between 1914-1918, he fought with exceptional 
distinction as a lieutenant in the Wuerttemberg Mountain Battal-
ion, earning the German Empire's highest military decoration 
(Pour le M~rite) and finding his m~tier as an officer unexcelled 
in exploiting chance situations. According to the evaluation of 
t- e Yl'la1V>ed 
a senior instructor in 1931, Rommel basically that lieu-
tenant, making instant decisions and acting on the spur of his 
battlefield impressions. War is the province of danger, uncer-
tainty, and chance, and Rommel would exceed every division com-
fi1phe1-
mander and in World War II in his capability to move within 
the framework of danger and to exploit the combat opportunities 
associated with chance. It is this mastery of the fundamental 
atmosphere of war that qualifies Rommel as a military genius. 
12. The German Empire of the day comprised 25 states and one 
Imperial Land. The four most important based on tradition and 
the strength of regional particularism, maintained their own 
armies - - those of Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, and Wuerttemberg. 
The Armies of the latter states, of course, were synchronized in 
command style and technology wlth the Prussian. 
2 
At war's end, 1918, the Army promoted Rommel to captain, and 
after many turbulent months during the German revolution, the 
Army chose him as one of an elite body of officers to remain in 
the drastically reduced army of the Treaty Reichswehr. Rommel 
served from 1920-1929 as seemingly permanent company commander in 
an infantry regiment at Stuttgart near his birthplace at Ulm in 
southern Germany. Rommel then served as junior instructor at the 
Dresden infantry school from 1930-1933 and finally as commander 
of an infantry battalion beginning in the latter year. In 1935, 
the Army assigned him as senior instructor at the new infantry 
school at Postdam, a suburb of Berlin. The Army recognized in 
him a special flair for tactics and an ebullient professionalism 
almost perfect for teaching., In 1937, he published a sparkling 
book but unlikely best seller entitled, The Infantry Attacks, an 
which brought him to the attention of Hitler and resulted 
in his assignment as special advisor to the Hitler Youth organi-
zation in 1937-1938. In November 1938, the Army posted Rommel as 
commandant of the officer cadet school at Wiener-Neustadt in 
newly annexed Austria. Hitler continued to be impressed by 
Rommel, however, and gave him command of his mobile headquarters 
for the occupation of Czecho-Slovakia in March 1939 and other 
escort duties culminating in command of the Fuehrer's War Head-
quarters for the Polish Campaign. 
Promoted to the rank of Generalmajor (Brigadier General U.S. 
equivalent) in 1939, Rommel was ready for command of a division 
after his special assignment during the war in Poland. Rommel 
somewhat presumptuously requested one of the new panzer divisions 




that was dominated by infantry assignments and war in the moun-
tains. Hitler seems to have intervened in the assignment process 
and the Army ultimately ordered Rommel to command of the 7th 
Panzer Division on 6 February 1940. Under Rommel's leadership, 
the division would achieve the most substantial results of any 
German division engaged in the French Campaign. Rommel would 
lead the division literally from the front and maneuver according 
to his personally conceptualized Stosslinie (thrust line) . Under 
Rommel, the division would be first to cross the Meuse River, 
move consistently faster and deeper than any other German divi-
sion for the remainder of the campaign, successfully repel a 
strong Anglo-French counterattack fn its exposed right flank near 
cambrai, and take masses of prisoners from respectable opponents 
prior to the final collapse on 22 June 1940. 
Rommel's Location In Battle 
Throughout World War I and while in command of 7th Panzer 
Division in France in May-June 1941, Rommel led his formations 
from the front. He achieved extraordinary success during both 
periods of war almost entirely through means of this style of 
command. In North Africa, as corps, and later army commander, 
Rommel continued to lead from the front. He achieved the great 
success of his life in the attack of 26 May 1942, which resulted 
in the defeat of the British field army in Libya and the seizure 
of the Tobruk fortress by 21 June. He won this victory at the 
army level of command as Generaloberst (Colonel General or U.S. 




elements of the combat forces he sensed were at the crucial point 
in the battle. 
In a surrounding climate of danger, uncertainty, and chance, 
Rommel reduced uncertainty and took advantage of chance by his 
personal, physical presence with the advanced elements of attack-
ing forces. Just how far forward was Rommel during the German 
offensive against the British Gazala13 positions in May and June 
of 1942? On 31 May 1942, Headquarters, German Africa Corps (OAK) 
formed Battle Group (Kampfgruppe} Major von Block from the 15th 
Panzer Division and ordered it to take the British fortified 
"box" at Got el Ualeb. This British box blocked the supply lines 
of the mobile forces of Panzer Army Africa entangled at that 
stage of the battle in an untenable position in the middle of 
strong, intact British forces. Built around IIIrd Battalion, 
104th Motorized Rifle Regiment, Kampfgruppe Block and its modest 
but critically poised forces, began the attack at 0715 on 1 June 
1942 carrying on its slender back much of the hope for German 
success in the entire battle. DAK14 supported the attack with 
Stuka (Junker 870 dive bomber) sorties but the Germans made no 
gains until the artillery commander of the Kampf gruppe moved into 
the front line to experience personally the resistance that held 
up the assault force. He picked out the apparent Schwerpunkt of 
the British defenses and ordered a change of position and "new 
insertion" of the artillery. The Kampfgruppe began to bring in 
13. Gazala is a small town located close to the Mediterranean Sea, 
65 km west of Tobruk. See Maps 1 and 2 for all such place names. 
14. German Africa Corps or Deutsches Afrika Korps or OAK. 
5 
more effective artillery fire and coordinated another stuka 
strike by 0830. At this juncture the fighting seemed to be 
stabilizing to the advantage of the British in spite of the 
German exertions. If the box held another day, the German mobile 
force, five divisions organized into the OAK and the Italian XXth 
f/Jofot-li~ 
· Corps, · would likely be forced to withdraw to the area west 
ya.if 
of the British minefields between Gazala and Bir Hacheim. 
Mid-morning at approximately 0900, the engagement report of 
Kampfgruppe Block almost casually but with evident total surprise 
at the turn of events, painted the following picture: "At this 
moment, the Oberbefehlshaber (commander in chief], Colonel Gener-
al Rommel appeared in the right platoon [!] of the 11th Infantry 
Company and accompanied the entire further attack of the battal-
ion in the farthest forward line. 1115 Attacking southward, Kampf-
qruppe Block and Rommel began to gain ground. By noon, as tank 
elements of 15th Panzer Division moved alongside from the east to 
support the attack, the British l50th Brigade collapsed in the 
box. Rommel had secured the communications of his five mobile 
divisions east of the British mine fields. The destruction of 
lSOth Infantry Brigade was a turning point in the battle. Rommel 
had effected that turning point by his physical presence in the 
middle of an advance skillfully coordinated by a lean staff and 
executed by a Kampfqruppe assembled late afternoon of the day 
before the attack. A commander at the end of a communications 
device miles away from the battle surrounded by a large over-
15. 21.Pz.D., Ia, Anlage zum KTB Nr. 5, Gefechtsbericht 
III./Schuetz. Rgt. 104 (mot), 2.6.42, U.S., Archives, German 
Records, Divisions, T-313, Roll 768, Fr. 000866. 
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ranked staff can be imagined only with difficulty to have 
achieved the same result. 
Rommel's "lieutenant style" proved ideal for maintaining a 
high tempo of advance in mobile war and exploitation of 
opportunity in complex, swirling mobile battle. Rommel often 
accompanied the leading elements of advancing forces and, on the 
spot, ordered tactical formations into new moves based on his 
immediate impressions. As commander in chief, notwithstanding 
his front line penchant, he acted at the operational level of war 
by ordering tactical moves that contributed directly to the 
successes of the battles being linked together by him to form the 
operation. In a word, when Rommel ordered a tactical move, it 
more or less automatically became an operational maneuver based 
on his position and outlook on the campaign in progress. 
The following incident during the 450-mile advance of late 
January 1942 from El Agheila to Gazala illustrates the style. On 
22 January, 5th Machine Gun Battalion, 15th Panzer Division, 
formed another of the omnipresent German Kampfgruppen (battle 
groups) of the desert war to include a lOSmm howitzer detachment, 
lOOmm gun battery, and one company of somm Pak (antitank guns). 
The OAK (German African Corps) ordered the machine gun battalion 
Kampfgruppe to be the advanced attachment of yet a larger Kampf-
gruppe Warrelmann and move east though the great road junction at 
Agedabia and the smaller but even more important road junction at 
Antelet farther east. German seizure of Antelet would put the 
Panzer Gruppe in position to outflank the strong British forces 
to the north around the port of Benghasi or to advance across the 
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open desert inland to Gazala lying far away to the northeast. 
The Germans recognized Antelet as crucial operational terrain and 
an area through which they would have to move quickly in order to 
continue to keep the British off balance. 
As the machine gun battalion Kampfgruppe advanced toward 
Agedabia, it believed itself to be the advanced element of the 
Panzer Group in the offensive. At 1130, 22 January 1942 as it 
reached the minefields in front of Agedabia, it discovered that 
fields had already been breached by a neighboring Kampfgruppe of 
21st Panzer Division personally led by Rommel who was first 
through the minefield and now advancing on Agedabia in the lead 
of the Panzer Army. The machine gun battalion Kampfgruppe re-
ceived new orders to continue the advance through Agedabia to 
Antelet now following the commander in chief. The Kampf gruppe 
moved through Agedabia as darkness fell and continued into the 
night toward Antelet. Then, six kilometers before Antelet "in 
the darkness along the road, the commander in chief appeared in 
front of the leader of the Kampfgruppe and ordered: 'defend 
Antelet and hold at whatever cost. 11116 Rommel had already person-
ally pressed 21st Panzer Division on to the north and now person-
ally in an oral order set the machine gun battalion on its way to 
secure the communications of the advancing spearhead of the 
Panzer Army - - in the middle of the night alongside a desert 
road. 
16. 15.P2.D., Ia, Anlage zum KTB Nr. 2, Gefechtsberichte des 
Maschinengewehrbataillons vom 22.1. bis 26.1.42, U.S., Archives, 
German Records, Divisions, T-313, Roll 666, Fr. 000593. 
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Rommel's Headquarters Kampfstaffel 
l £ tJattle 1~helon) 
In the active stages of all the mobile battles in the time 
period of this study, Rommel operated out of a relatively small 
and mobile battle headquarters. The Germans used the terms 
Panzer Army High Command Operations staff (Panzerarmeeoberkomman-
do Fuehrungsstab), or similarly, Army Combat Command Post (Ar-
meegefechtsstand) to describe this operationally-oriented head-
quarters. In the German Army, compared for example, with the 
Marine Corps today, such a headquarters was relatively small, and 
normally had a modest security element for the immediate protec-
tion of the commander and staff. With his penchant for interven-
ing directly in the battle, Rommel personally developed the 
security element of the Operations Staff into a unique combat 
force described as the Panzer Army High Command Kampf staff el or 
Combat Echelon of the Operations Staff. 
After the successful counterstroke of 21 January 1942 that 
moved the Germans 400 miles east along the Mediterranean from El 
Agheila to Gazala, Rommel ordered OAK to form a Beuteabteilung 
(Captured Materiel Detachment, approximately battalion strength) 
out of captured British and American Tanks. DAK assigned Oberst-
leutnant (Lieutenant Colonel) Ramsauer of 15th Panzer Division on 
12 February 1942, the task of putting together the first company 
of such a larger detachment. 17 Simultaneously, Rommel began to 
17. Pz.AOK Afrika, Ia, Anlage 14 zum KTB Nr. 3, DAK, Aufstellung 
einer Beute-Panzer-Abteilung, 12.2.42, U.S. Archives, German 
Records, Panzer Armies, T-313, Roll 426, Fr. 8719207. 
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put together a strong Kampf staffel for the Panzer Army Operation-
al Headquarters 18 and took most of the British tanks and set up 
a Beutepanzerkompanie {Captured Materiel Tank Company) in the 
army Kampfstaffel. Rommel operated in this situation with a 
style that illustrates the ingenuity, imagination, and practical-
ity of the man. He saw two things: first, the special possibili-
ties of a small masse de manoeuvre available to him personally at 
the Panzer Army Operational Headquarters, and second, the neces-
sity for a strong combat element to protect a headquarters that 
he characteristically projected in and among the opposing British 
forces along with him in the fluid combat of the desert. He knew 
such an element would need tanks; with his practicality and 
frugality, he could not justify taking German tanks from the two 
relatively thin panzer divisions. The answer was a Kampfstaffel 
with a British tank company. Similarly, but with a somewhat 
different general purpose, the Israeli Army organized an entire 
captured tank brigade of approximately 139 tanks after the June 
1967 War, and, in soldier's vernacular, referred to it as the 
Russian Brigade. 
In March and April 1942, Rommel and his staff pieced togeth-
er a Kampf staff el to meet the demands of extremely mobile opera-
tions against a first class motorized enemy in permissive terrain 
for movement and little cover or concealment from air attack. To 
the Beutepanzerkompanie of 12 British Mark III {16 tons, max 65mm 
armor, 40mm guns) and two Mark VI {20 tons, max 40mm armor, 40mm 
--------------------
18. Pz. ACK Afrika, O.Qu., Umgliederungen und Neuaufstellungen, 
Aufstellung der Kampfstaffel des O.B., 12.2.42, U.S., Archives, 
German Records, Panzer Armies, T-313, Roll 437, Fr. 8730292. 
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guns) tanks, Rommel added a special 1st Company consisting of a 
wild but effective melange of weapons for protecting the Army 
Operational Headquarters. Shortly before the Gazala offensive of 
26 May 1942, Rommel approved of a regular company of motorized 
infantry called Company von Koenen and designated 2nd Company of 
the Kampfstaffel. Rommel also approved a strong antiaircraft 
(Flak) battery, 3rd Battery, 43rd Antiaircraft Regiment, that 
held light and heavy weapons capable of engaging both armored 
ground targets and aircraft. These units comprised the Rommel 
Kampfstaffel - - Rommel's combined personal defense and assault 
element. They held the following men and weapons: 
Rommel Kampfstoffel (May - June 1942) 
Element Personnel 19* Heayy Weapons 
1. Kasta HQ 9/37/179 
and 1st Company + 
20mm Flak; ** 8 4 40mm Pak ( e) 
57mm Pak ** 3 SOmm Pak; l ( e) 
•• 1 75mm Pak; 1 86mm Arty ( e) 
2. 2nd Company 4/18/106 3 80mm mortars 
3. 3./143 4/17/156 2 20mm Flak; 8 88mm Flak 




e or English. 
Kast a or Kamofstaffel. 
19. For these personnel figures, see Pz.AOK Afrika, Kampfstaffel, 
OB, Kasta Tagesmeldung, 13.6.42, U.S., Archives, German Records, 
Panzer Armies, T-313, Roll 666, Fn. 8776055. 
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Ironically, Rommel ordered the company of captured British 
tanks away on a special mission two days before the attack. He 
held the strong force noted above as his personnel combat echelon 
on the day of Operation Venezia. In typical German Army style, 
Rommel placed Hauptmann {Captain) Kiehl in charge of a mixed 
500-man force that would probably demand a lieutenant colonel on 
the part of the Marine Corps today. 
In the confused combat of powerful armored forces among the 
fortified British "boxes," the Kampfstaffel provided necessary 
defense and launched attacks of its own. By 27 May 1942, Rom-
mel's sweep with his five mobile divisions around Bir Hacheim at 
the southern end of the British defenses had miscarried. The 
Panzer Army found itself being forced back through the British 
mine 
forces 
seas and fortified boxes 
rfs own, 
outnumberedA.... In a 
by an enemy field army whose tank 
situation filled with uncertainty 
and dominated by chance encounter, Rommel moved with his Battle 
Headquarters and strong Kampf staff el as a four-star general 
directing the maneuver of four axis army corps with approximately 
ten divisions. The following combat illustrates the fluid condi-
tions of desert war, the command style of a successful mobile 
commander, and the indispensable value of a strong headquarters 
battle echelon. 
Moving northeast since 0600 through desert terrain criss-
crossed by friendly and enemy marching forces and supply columns, 
the Battle Headquarters and Kampf staff el ran into a deployed 
British artillery battery and antitank guns. Rommel ordered the 
handful of German tanks he had within the Battle Headquarters as 





Rommel did not call for ~ assistance from some nearby German combat 
force but rather immediately attacked the enemy with his own 
personal resource. With this attack, the tanks of Battle Head-
quarters successfully forced the British to withdraw but suffered 
heavy losses: The detachment of five German tanks lost one 
Panzer III H (21 tons, max somm armor, somm gun) through direct 
hit by Pak, one Panzer IV Fl (23 tons, max somm armor, short 75mm 
gun) through direct hit by artillery, and two Panzer IIIs to 
engine breakdown during the maneuvering. The Battle Headquarters 
and Kampf staff el held the ground at the end of the fight and a 
German Panzerwerkstattkompanie (tank repair company) aggressively 
operating in the same area retrieved the four tanks and success-
fully repaired them. 20 
Shortly after this encounter, Rommel with his personal 
Begleitstaffel (Escort Echelon) of the Kampfstaffel continued 
farther to the front to find 33rd Reconnaissance Battalion, 21st 
Panzer Division. At 1245, "it bumped into" three British cruiser 
tanks (15 tons, max 30mm armor, 40mm guns) which "shot up" the 
captured British radio vehicle accompanying Rommel. The main 
protection for Rommel in the escort echelon was a platoon of four 
captured British 40mm truck-mounted Pak which fought off the 
British tanks forcing their retirement. Fifteen minutes later, 
the Kampfstaffel closing up behind Rommel ran into a British 
artillery battery on the march similarly to the Germans. The 
Kampfstaffel attacked scattering the more surprised British unit 
20. Pz, AOK Afrika, OB, Anlage zum KTB, Kampfstaffel, OB, Kasta 
Gefechtsbericht,27.5.42, U.S., Archives, German Records, Panzer 
Armies, T-313, Roll 477, Fr. 8775919. 
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capturing one gun and its towing tractor while destroying another 
gun and three trucks and taking 29 prisoners including two off i-
cers. This level of combat action around the Battle Headquarters 
of an army commander in a mobile desert engagement suggests a 
special dimension in desert warfare different from beach assault 
and insurgency warfare. 
Combat around the Kampfstaffel intensified later in the day. 
At 1430, British aircraft made low level attacks on the column 
with machine guns and bombs and hit one a-wheeled armored radio 
vehicle with a light bomb. Only two hours later, as the Battle 
Headquarters column halted to set up the Army Command Post, a 
strong British force attacked out of the north and northeast. 
The scene again represents elements of cultural shock for mili-
tary forces inexperienced in mobile war in the desert. The 
battle Headquarters of the four-star commander of a German field 
army was in the middle of a British attack aimed quite by chance 
at it - - the British, of course, did not know that they were 
attacking the Headquarters of Panzer Army Africa. In the battle 
that followed, the Kampfstaffel using its Flak battery ·and 1st 
Company assets of ssmm Flak, towed somm Pak, and one 75mm self 
propelled Pak, knocked out nine British cruiser tanks, two ar-
mored reconnaissance vehicles and two trucks. The British attack 
forced the Battle Headquarters to change position a short dis-
tance to the west where it . remained fixed for the next several 
days 3km south of Bir el Harmat and 12 km to the north northeast 
of Bir Hacheim, the southern fortress of the British defenses. 
The next day, 28 May 1942, illustrates the Kampfstaffel in 
14 
defense of the temporarily static Battle Headquarters of the 
Panzer Army. The 3rd Battery, 43rd Fak Regiment, set up a 
"linear" front of its weapons defending to the northeast. After 
intermittently firing at British armored reconnaissance vehicles, 
the Flak battery experienced a "sudden" tank attack from about 
15-20 British cruiser tanks which had moved around the battery 
positions from the southeast and immediately attacked the sur-
prised Germans. In an intense gunfire engagement that lasted 20 
minutes, the Flak battery destroyed 13 British cruiser tanks 
including three that had advanced to approximately 50m of the 
German 88mm and 20mm Flak firing positions protecting Rommel's 
Battle Headquarters. The fight was brutal for the British. The 
Flak battery combat report noted laconically that the British 
"commander, another officer, and six other crew personnel were 
taken prisoners. The rest of the crews died in the tanks. 1121 The 
Kampfstaffel lost one man badly wounded and expended 132 rounds 
of 88mm antitank and 60 rounds of 20mm antitank ammunition in 
repulsing this British surprise attack and achieving an annihi-
lating tactical result. The Flak battery held the battlefield at 
the end of the fight and its brief note on British losses can be 
taken as accurate. 
In the days following 28 June 1942, Rommel used the Kampf-
staffel in two additional thought provoking ways. Located in the 
middle of strong British mobile units, he several times used 
Kampfstaffel units to support neighboring German mobile forma-
21. Pz. AOK Africa, OB, Anlage zum KTB,Kampfstaffel, Gefechtsbe-
richt, 3./Flak 43, 28.5.42, U.S., Archives, German Records, 
Panzer Armies, T-313, Roll 477, Fr. 8775296. 
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tions against anticipated British attacks. The Free-French and 
British fortified box at Bir Hacheim held out tena~iously until 
11 June 1942, and Rommel used 2nd Company of the Kampfstaffel 
with additional Flak and Pak actually to launch an attack against 
the fortress alongside of other strong German forces. Later on 
19 and 20 June 1942, Rommel again inserted the Kampfstaffel into 
an attack this time against Tobruk. Rommel seems to have envi-
sioned the formation not only as a strong security element for 
his exposed Battle Headquarters against both air and ground 
attack, but also as a unique maneuver element immediately avail-
able to him as a forward-oriented commander to take advantage of 
chance in battle. 
Rommel's Thrust Line 
Technique in Mobile War 
Rommel introduced the Stosslinie (thrust line) into use in 
the German 7th Panzer Division after he assumed command in 
February 1940 and used it during the French Campaign. The 
technique proved to be superior to the use of map coordinates or 
geographical features as means of designating locations on 
tactical and operational maps. After Rommel left 7th Panzer 
division, its next commander Generalmajor Hans Freiherr von 
Funck, used the thrust line throughout 1941 in the Russian 
Campaign. In North Africa, Rommel enforced the technique in 
Panzer Army Africa and the records give almost innumerable exam-
ples of its use. 
Just what advantages did Rommel sense in placing a line - -
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generally a single straight line but sometimes one with a single 
turning point in it on a map, around which he would direct 
movement and demand the location of subordinate units? During 
the French Campaign (May-June 1940}, he stated that the thrust 
line had the special advantage of security over designation by 
map coordinates or geographical features. An alert enemy with 
captured maps can detect map coordinates even when encoded and, 
of course, easily through radio listening in the event of uncoded 
coordinates sent over the air. The Germans sometimes encoded 
numbers used with thrust lines, but generally they simply gave 
the numbers calculated for the designated locations. With thrust 
lines changed often, there was virtually no way that an enemy 
could reproduce it. Halfway through the Gazala battles, Rommel's 
Battle Headquarters ordered the 33rd Armored Reconnaissance 
Battalion to move to new positions west of Bir Hacheim to block 
any escape of the Free French Brigade in that surprise direction. 
The Panzer Army order reads simply "To block Bir Hacheim to the 
west, 33rd Armored Reconnaissance Battalion is attached [to 
Panzer Army] and ordered to set itself in at 175.S right 
31.5 •... " No enemy seizing that document or hearing the order 
transmitted in the clear could locate that point. 
Although the thrust line was uniquely secure, it cannot be 
claimed that security was the main reason for its creation by 
Rommel. He undoubtedly saw the stosslinie as an ultra quick way 
of moving and locating forces and giving his own location in the 
clear without even the necessity to encode a single number. 
Associated with Rommel, the thrust line gave him and the Germans 
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one of many edges that they displayed over their opponents in the 
desert. Map 3 illustrates the thrust line for the German offen-
sive planned against Tobruk for late November 1941. The German 
sketch on the map shows one elegantly simple line heading into 
the British position around which all commanders and combat 
soldiers could orient their efforts. 
18 
19 
Map 3. Planned German 
Attack on Tobruk (Tobruk) 
(Nov 41). Note Thrust Line. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE GERMAN STYLE IN MOBILE WAR 
In preparing themselves for the next move in mobile combat, 
German military units of appropriate size, for example, divi-
sions, instinctively organized themselves into Marschgruppen and 
Kampfgruppen (march groups and battle groups) . In mobile cam-
paigns like France (1940), Russia (1941), and North Africa 
(1941-42), German divisions rarely fought as divisions but rather 
maneuvered into contact with the enemy and fought as a tactical 
conglomerate of several self contained Kampfgruppen (battle 
groups). In the active stages of ongoing battle, the German 
divisions reorganized and reconcentrated daily for the next day's 
combat. This process of reorganization and reconcentration was 
ubiquitous in mobile warfare. The German Army in World War II 
organized different Kampf gruppen and concentrated them nightly 
for the following day's battle more effectively than any other 
Army in the mobile stages of the various European campaigns. 
The German Army commanders, staffs, and combat soldiers 
seemed to possess some special instinct in reforming Kampf gruppen 
and fighting in them. In analysis of European combat in World 
War II, British commentators have noted the superiority of the 
Germans fighting in what the British often characterized as "ad 
h " 't (' oc uni s i.e., "for the sake of this case alone"). The Brit-
ish based their estimate on studies later in the war with the 
Germans on the defensive. They stated essentially that in disas-
trous defensive situations, the German Army threw together forces 
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to overcome individual, unique one-time crises with special 
success. The British recognized this skill but associated it 
with some provident expertise in improvisation that served the 
Germans well in the defensive stages of the war. 
In the grand German offensives of the first part of World 
War II, however, and the mobile battles in North Africa in 1941-
42, the Germans just as characteristically, and with the same 
technical and tactical skill, put together Kampfgruppen. On the 
defensive, the German Army put together Kampfgruppen largely to 
survive immediate, overwhelming pressures from a numerically and 
materially superior enemy. On the offensive, one observes a 
totally different rationale. The Germans formed them when at-
tacking in mobile warfare to seize crucial ground but more gener-
ally to defeat strong groupments of enemy forces. German com-
manders and staffs showed a flexibility in putting together the 
innumerable Kamofgruppen that characterized the German style in 
mobile war. German combat soldiers showed special qualities of 
"teamwork" in constantly shifting in and out of different Kampfg-
ruppen. They also showed some difficult to define but neverthe-
less tangible will to succeed in the attack. 
The German Kampfgruppe (Battle Group) 
in North Africa 
The German 15th Panzer Division reacted to the far-reaching 
British Crusader Offensive · in a way that illustrates the Kampf-
gruppe-style of combat in war in the desert. The British began 
the crusader operations on 18 November 1941 with the surprise 
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move of the mass of the armor of the field army around the south-
ern end of the German fortifications anchored near Sidi Omar 45 
km from Sollum in Egypt on the Mediterranean Sea. The massive 
British force moved during the night and projected itself far 
behind Panzer Army Africa. Rommel and his headquarters did not 
realize the full magnitude of the danger and on 19 November 1941 
sent 21st Panzer Division piecemeal (i.e., without its running 
mate, 15th Panzer Division, DAK) to engage British forces that if 
seriously engaged together would probably have destroyed it. 
Fortunately for the active Germans, both sides groped in the dark 
for each other until the first big engagements of 22, 23 November 
1941 in which the Germans fought concentrated. 
The 15th Panzer Division did not begin to make serious 
contact with the British mobile force that had driven close to 
the Tobruk fortress to link up with its British garrison until 21 
November 1942. With a successful linkup, the British envisioned 
destroying the surrounded OAK now lying to the east. Panzer Army 
Africa envisioned simultaneously hunting down and destroying the 
British masse de manoeuvre while maintaining the siege lines 
around Tobruk. Such intentions represent the mutually opposed 
wills of opponents in war that breed uncertainty and friction in 
battle and lead to the quick obsolescence of long written orders. 
At 2015 on 21 November, OAK ordered 15th Panzer Division to 
concentrate south of Gambut for a coordinated blow with 21st 
Panzer Division against the British mobile force lying to the 
south. In characteristic German style, OAK ordered the concen-
tration and necessary regrouping at a time that required 15th 
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Panzer Division to reorganize and move during the middle of the 
night. 
The DAI< order not only necessitated a night movement of the 
entire division but also required disengagement from British 
forces up against parts of the organization. The division set up 
a rear guard to hold its early evening position of 21 November 
until 0300 the next morning. The rear guard consisted of a 
strong detachment of 1st Battalion, 115th Motorized Infantry, 
artillery, and Pak (antitank guns). The division commander did 
not march the 15th Panzer Division to its new concentration area 
I 
as a single force. He ordered the setting up of three Marschg-
ruppen (march groups) which under the conditions of impending 
heavy combat were in fact three large Kampfgruppen. Generalmajor 
(Brigadier General) Neumann-Silkow was able to move the division 
along two axes in three self standing maneuver elements. Between 
2100-2400, 21 November 1941, at night and in contact with enemy 
forces, 21st Panzer Division reorganized itself into the follow-
ing groups: 22 
Kanpfgruppe Lt Col Cramer 
(Marschgruppe A) 
Panzer Rgt. 8 
3rd Battery, Flak Rgt 33 
1st Bn, Arty Regt 33 
Staff, Arty Regt 33 
3rd Bn, Arty Regt 33 
Div Staff 
78th Armored Comn Bn 
Kanpfgruppe Col Menny 
(Marschgruppe 8) 
Staff, 15th Moto Rifle Bde 
115th Moto Rifle Rgt 
33rd ~ en 
33rd Armored Engr Bn 
2nd Bn, Arty Regt 33 
Kanpfgruppe Lt Col Geissler 
CMarschgruppe C) 
Staff, 200th Moto Rifle Rgt 
15th Motorcycle Bn 
2nd Machine Gun Bn 
22. 15.Pz.D., Ia, KTB Nr.2, Seite 10, noch 21.11.41, U.S., Ar-
chives, German Records, Divisions, T-313, Roll 664, Fr. 000411. 
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In spite of the fatigue of the combat and movement of 21 
November, difficult road conditions, night movement, and British 
control of the air, Groups A and B moved out promptly at 2400 and 
Group c at 0100 22 November 1941. The rear guard followed at 
0300. The 15th Panzer Division was not a small unit. March 
Group A, for example, moved out with 144 battle and command 
tanks. The movement proceeded with little internal friction, and 
Neumann-Silkow radioed OAK at 0730 that the division had reached 
its concentration area. 
During this same period of time, 21st Panzer Division, the 
other division of OAK, fought largely in self standing Kampfgrup-
pen that were constantly reorganized. At 1210 on 19 November 
1942, the division commander ordered the formation of Kampfgruppe 
Stephan in the face of the somewhat premature OAK order to seek 
out and destroy the British mobile force between Tobruk and the 
Egyptian border and now lying south and west of OAK. The 
Kampf gruppe was typical of the stronger German battle groups and 
consisted of the following: 23 
Kampfgruppe Stephan (After 1210 19 Nov 41) 
8th Panzer Rgt (that moment w/124 operational tanks) 
2nd Bn, Arty Rgt 33 (approx 12 105mm howitzers) 
3rd Battery, Flak Rgt 18 (mixed, 2 20mm and 4 88mm guns) 
Generalmajor Johannes von Ravenstein, the division commander, 
directed the Kampfgruppe to isolate and destroy a British motor-
ized force located by 3rd Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion and 
23. 21.P2.D., Ia, Anlage zum KTB Nr. 2, Gefechtsbericht, Pz.R.5, 
17.11.-31.12.42, U.S., Archives, German Records, Divisions, T-
313, Roll 767, Fr 000213. 
24 
estimated initially to hold approximately 200 tanks and numerous 
other vehicles and guns. Oberst (Colonel) Stephan moved south 
with his Kampfgruppe at 1420 and soon located the British force 
now estimated at 130 tanks and numerous other armored vehicles, 
guns, and trucks. In a fight lasting about two hours until the 
approach of darkness, Oberst Stephan engaged the powerful British 
force and threw it back to the southeast toward the Egyptian 
border. The Kampfgruppe claimed 21 British-held American tanks 
as destroyed and remaining on the battlefield mostly by the guns 
of the attached 3rd Flak Battery. German records show the fol-
lowing friendly losses: 24 
Kampfgruppe Stephan Engagement (Afternoon 19 Nov 41) 
a. Tanks: Catastrophic Kill by Gunfire - 2 Panzer III. 
b. Tank: Damaged, Repairable but lying in enemy country -
1 Panzer II. 
c. Tanks: Damaged, Repairable, Retrieved by Panzer Mainte-
nance Company off battlefield but lost to 15th 
Panzer Division by evacuation rearward - 4 Panzer III 
d. Tanks: Mechanical Breakdown - 1 Panzer III 
The Germans put together Kampfgruppe Stephan in the brief 
period from 1210-1430 with movement to combat beginning at the 
latter time. In spite of this short notice, the group fought a 
coordinated action with the Flak maneuvering effectively enough 
with the German tanks to get credit for knocking out most of the 
British tanks. The Germans also achieved a favorable exchange 
ratio - - 8 tanks damaged in various degrees compared with 21 
permanently lost by the British - - a circumstance supporting a 
24. Ibid., Fr. 000214. 
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view of some special tactical efficiency of the Germans in the 
battle. 
The Germans put together these battle groups in innumerable 
shapes and forms. Later in the campaign, in March 1942, OAK 
ordered 21st Panzer Division to conduct a reconnaissance in force 
designed to clear ground in front of it in order to move the OAK 
and Italian XXth Motorized Corps into more favorable positions 
for the eventual offensive at Gazala. The new division commander 
at that time, Generalmajor George von Bismarck, decided to set up 
Kampf gruppe Bismarck under his personal leadership to conduct the 
foray. 25 Bismarck received the order on 13 March 1942 with the 
requirement to move on the morning of 16 March. To accomplish 
the mission he put together a medium-sized Kampfgruppe that 
concentrated in its positions for the advance by 2000 15 March. 
He built the force for an advance across open desert against an 
enemy with strong armored reconnaissance forces and the danger of 
air attack. The Kampfgruppe looked suspiciously like a Panzer 
division in microcosm. Figure 2 26shows a force with just about 
anything necessary for combat but with special emphasis in the 
open desert on weapons rather than men, e.g., the force held only 
one platoon of motorized infantry. The Figure also shows a 
somewhat awkward organization with Bismarck as a senior commander 
with only one modest-sized maneuver force. Bismarck probably 
25. Generalmajor Johannes von Ravenstein had been captured by the 
British on 29 Nov 41 in the fluid, mobile combat of the crusader 
battles. 
26. 21.Pz.o., Ia, Anlage zum KTB Nr. 3, Abt. Ia Nr. 98/42 Geh., 
Unternehmen Bismarck, 13.3.42, U.S., Archives, German Records, 
Divisions, T-313, Roll 768, Fr. 000234. 
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Kampf gruppe Leadership Element 
Cmdr, 21st Panzer Div (Generalmajor G. von Bismarck) 
Part of Div Command 
Part of 2d Co, 200th Panzer Comm Bn 
Three Recon Troops, 33d Panzer Recon Bn 
Div Recon Platoon 
Kampf gruppe Troop Element 
Cmdr, IId Bn, 104th Motorized Inf Rqt and staff 
One Panzer Co (Reinf), 5th Panzer Rqt 
One Battery, 155th Arty Reqt {105mm Howitzers) 
one Pak Co (minus one plt), 39th Panzer AT Bn* 
One Motorized Inf Plt, 104th Motorized Inf Rqt 
One Pioneer Plt. 200th Panzer Pioneer Bn 
One Fla Plt, 617th Fla Bn** 
Part of Supply Troops, 21st Panzer Div 
*Pak or PanzerabwehrKanone or antitank gun. 
**Fla or "Army antiaircraft cannon" in contradistinction to Flak 
or "Air Force antiaircraft cannon." 
Figure 2. 
Kampfgruppe Bismarck (15, 16 Mar 42) 
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envisioned the relatively strong reconnaissance assets in the 
leadership element as another maneuver element. 
It is difficult to overemphasize the German use of night 
time to regroup into new Kampfgruppen for the next day's mission 
and to be on the move into combat by Morgengrauen (break of day) 
a term used by the Germans in their orders over and over 
again to indicate the time at which the next offensive maneuver 
would begin. After a day of considerable movement and moderate 
combat on 26 November 1942 in the area behind the Sollum front, 
15th Panzer Division went through the following evolution that 
illustrates German style in the middle of a major operation. In 
night rest positions finally by midnight on 26 November, the 
division received the order from Rommel himself at Panzer Group 
to attack the British behind the Sollum front from the rear. 
Shortly after the midnight hour, in an example of the flexibility 
demanded in mobile war, the division received a new order to move 
in the opposite direction directly toward Tobruk to retrieve the 
.slfu~fl~n , a, move wnie!, demf,intie/ the reo1-vamz.af1tJn 
~ · of the division during darkness and advance toward the 
enemy before daybreak. In full darkness, the division reorgan-
ized itself into four Kampfgruppen with missions to move as 
follows to the desert road leading west to Sidi Azeiz and Tobruk 
and then along it toward the enemy: 27 
Kampfgruppe f1I - 33rd Armored Engineer Bn with one company 
33rd Antitank Bn, and followed by IIIrd Bn, 33rd Artillery Regt. 
Task: Reach the road and proceed east at 0430. 
27. 15.Pz.D., Ia, KTB Nr. 2, 27.ll, 41, U.S., Archives, German 
Records, Divisons, T-313, Roll 664, Fr. 000445. 
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Kampfgruppe 121 - 2nd Machine Gun Bn with one platoon 33rd 
Antitank Bn. Task: Reach the road and proceed east at 0440. 
Kampfgruppe f3f - 8th Panzer Regt with 1st Battery, 33rd 
Flak Regiment, one company1. 33rd Antitank Bn, with staff 33rd 
Antitank Bn, and Div staff. Task: Reach the road and proceed 
east at 0445. 
Kampfgruppe ~'49 - 115th Motorized Infantry Regt, with one 
platoon, 33rd Antitank Bn, and IId Bn, 33rd Artillery Regt 
aR'Jr;l1'11 
organized in I the infantry battalions. Task: Reach the 
road and proceed east at 0500. 
In spite of heavy interference from march columns of 21st 
Panzer Division also moving at night in the same area, the divi-
sion reached the road on schedule. Once the division was on the 
road, the division commander moved the 8th Panzer Regiment to the 
front to lead the march east. By shortly after the break of day, 
the first element of tanks lay on the road just east of Sidi 
Azeiz and heading into it. At that moment, approximately 0600 27 
November 1941, it received artillery fire from the area around 
the village. 
The Germans reorganized and moved at night with a style and 
tempo of action that led to shattering tactical victories during 
the war. On the move, alert, and advancing with an urgent, 
distant mission, the panzer regiment immediately deployed and 
attacked supported by a battery of four 105mm howitzers that had 
been moving in column with it. The division commander recognized 
the British force as a "strong enemy" and ordered all of the 
division's artillery forward and into action in support of the 
panzers. The heavy artillery battalion (150mm howitzers and 
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1oomm field guns) was farthest forward and added its fire to that 
lvd~ d I LJ r't1 
of the leigh~ battery at short range of about 3,000-4,000m. The 
British force was immediately smothered by German artillery fire 
which continued to be reinforced. Supported by this fire and the 
advance of the division pioneer battalion, the tanks in a brief 
15-minute fire fight broke into the village area and forced the 
surrender of the headquarters of 5th New Zealand Brigade and 
other units encamped around it taking 800 prisoners. The German 
artillery regiment commander remarked that the battle ended 
before he could get the artillery into action out of the rear 
Kampfgruppe in the division column. The Germans excelled in 
surprise encounters like this one in World War II. 
As the circumstances above show, the Germans excelled be-
cause of the sense of urgency and tempo in their operations. As 
the British slept in their laager around Sidi Azeiz, the Germans 
reorganized and moved through the desert in the night. As the 
Germans advanced out of the edge of darkness onto Sidi Azeiz they 
moved to the urgent drum beat of yet.another offensive thrust 
that they ha.d worked through the hours of darkness to generate. 
The special energy reflected in continuous operation through 
night and into day maintained the initiative for the Germans and 
gave them the edge in surprise encounters characteristic of 
mobile war. 
Location of the German 
Commander in Combat 
In Command of 7th Panzer Division in France (1940), Rommel 




leading column in a division advance. In command of Panzer Army 
Africa in 1941-42 28 Ro~mel led with the same style during 
similar periods of high intensity mobile war. During the 
considerable periods of quiet in the ground campaign, he visited 
subordinate commanders or frontal positions of the combat troops 
on almost a daily basis. 29 Other German mobile force commanders 
similarly led from the front during the French Campaign and most 
of Rommel's subordinate commanders in Libya affected the same 
style. The German Army in the development of its mobile forces 
encouraged the commanders to lead from as far forward as 
possible. It is difficult to estimate the balance between the 
C ~rl17Cln /I'/ ?f!l1t'ra/ Ii? ~tftttJ/ Al-
influence of theAArmy/\ and Rommel/I on the minds of the German 
commanders in North Africa. Suffice it to say, that ... German 
commanderS led from the front in a style encouraged by the Army 
and with the powerful additional stimulus of the example set by 
the commander in chief ~n North Africa~imself°!) 
Leading from the front, the German commander was able to cut 
through uncertainty and master chance in their exaggerated forms 
in mobile battle. Positioned forward in the battle itself, the 
commander of an attacking force has the best opportunity through 
his direct impressions of the fighting to clear up uncertainty. 
Located in the same position, he has similar opportunity to 
master chance surprise encounter and other unexpected violence 
28. Actually German Africa Corps (1941), Panzer Group Africa 
(August 1941-January 1942), then Panzer Army Africa for the 
remainder of the period of this study. 
t\Dv 
29. Note, for example, Pz. ACK Afriek, KTB, 15.8/-18.11.41, U.S., 
Archives, German Records, Panzer Armies, T-313, Roll 423, Fr. 
8715788-89. 
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and maneuver on the part of the enemy. With th~ stress on 
continuous regrouping and movement at night, the German commander 
In poSJ'e~.t 1on of 
also tended to keep the initiative on the battlefield. A ..... the 
1n. Ge. IJo./lle, 11 flyhf 
initiative~ he established the offensive Schwerpunkt in the ,, J 
led 
and . the Schwerpunkt formation. Placed forward in the bat-
tle, the commander would have impressions necessarily limited to 
the area around him, but those impressions would be from the 
center of the battle and in touch with reality. 
Earlier in the Crusader battles, for example, 8th Panzer 
Regiment had greater success in a meeting engagement than that 
related above at Sidi Azeiz. Success was based on the same 
~trl'fJt'l'J /!f~ral/t 
factors plus the/\ commander being locatedlf at ·the front of the 
unit. On 22 November 1941, in full darkness at 1900, 30 the 
panzer regiment received the mission to move out immediately to 
the northwest to seize ground lying 14km from Sidi Rezegh. After 
moving 4km through the night, the 1st Battalion, 8th Panzer 
Regiment ran into a tightly bunched concentration of vehicles. 
At lOm distance, the panzer battalion commander moving in the 
veh1de 
leadAof his unit recognized the . as British. He contin-
ued to drive straight through the British laager and whi1e doing 
so ordered his following 1st Company to move to the left and the 
/YJ a,tJd QWIOV'l'f 
2d Company to the rightA ' &§ · ir the British vehicles. The 
battalion commander then ordered the headlights on the German 
tanks to be turned on and the tank commanders to use the table of 
organization machine pistols of the vehicles on foot to force the 
30. Sunset that day was at approximately 1715. 
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surrender of the surprised British tank crews in the laager. Not 
a single shot was fired until one British tank moved to get away 
and was shot up in flames by the German tank crews remaining in 
their tanks. A British officer managed to set one more tank on 
fire furnishing additional light for the Germans to take more 
prisoners. The panzer battalion had captured the commander of 
the British 4th Tank Brigade, 17 officers, 150 men, 36 tanks and 
numerous other weapons and pieces of equipment. 31 
The German tank column moved through the darkness with an 
urgency and tempo superior to that of the British force 
recovering in laager from the day's fighting. The German 
battalion commander led from the leading vehicle of the column 
and immediately glimpsed the reality and grasped the opportunity 
of the encounter. From his advanced location he cut through the 
uncertainty and mastered the element of chance in the surprise 
encounter battle. 
In a directive circulated to his subordinate commanders 
during the deployment to Libya early in 1941, the division com-
mand of 15th Panzer Division pointed out the following about the 
31. 15.Pz.D., Ia, KTB Nr. 2, Seite 4, 22.11.41, U.S., Archives, 
German Records, Divisions, T-313, Roll 664, Fr. 000417. 
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see for themselves, 
have a lead so far to the front of their troops that 
they are in a position to provide them with orders 
without them having to stop (a command friendly orders 
style). The location of the leader as far forward as 
possible (the leader of the point company behind the 
point, the leader of the rear guard behind the most 
advanced company, etc.). Special protection most 
necessary for the leader!" 
In Panzer Army Africa, German commanders operated largely in 
accordance with the spirit expressed in these words. Rommel 
personally exemplified the style and his headquarters Kampfstaf-
fel (battle echelon) the practical necessity to protect him and 
give him a small additional maneuver element. German division 
commanders accompanied their advanced units in maneuver and 
attack. Typically, for example, in his order for the movement of 
the 21st Panzer Division closer to Bir Hacheim for impending 
Operation Venezia, Generalmajor von Bismarck noted specifically 
in the last paragraph of the movement order: "I ride alongside 
of the commander of the 5th Panzer Regiment [the lead element]. 
My Operations Echelon and Quartermaster behind the panzer regi-
ment. 1133 
In combat, the division commander stood in the same advanced 
position. At 1620 23 November 1942, the commander, 15th Panzer 
Division, stood physically in the middle of the combat of the 8th 
32. 15.Pz.D., Ia, Anlage zum Taetigkeitsbericht, Kommando, 
15.Pz.D., Anhaeltspunkte fuer die Motorisierte Gefechtsausbil-
dung, U.S., Archives, German Records, Divisions, T-313, Roll 664, 
Fr. 000250. 
33. 21.Pz.D., Ia, Anlage zum KTB Nr. 5, Division Befehl fuer den 
Vormarsch am 1./2.5.41 nach Bir Hacheim. U.S., Archives, German 
Records, Divisions, T-31j, Roll 768, Fr. 000813. 
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Panzer Regiment near Sidi Rezegh on the verge of the substantial 
German victory that day. The war diary of the division noted 
that "the division commander standing in the most advanced line 
where it is always necessary to be, recognized an enemy attack 
coming in on the left flank of the division. Enemy tanks includ-
ing heavily armored Mark II tanks began an attack. The division 
commander personally snatched up an 88mm Flak and a heavy field 
howitzer (lSOmm] and directed the location of the firing 
position. Under the fire direction of Captain Fromm, commander, 
1st Battery, 18th Flak Regiment, the attack was repulsed. 1134 
This account is a little classic. The division commander in the 
middle of the combat with his panzer regiment, personally 
detected a strong enemy attack with tanks impervious to German 
tank and Pak fire. Cutting through any uncertainty about what 
was happening by his presence in the path of the enemy attack, 
the division commander also mastered chance disaster in the 
presence of the Mark II tanks by personally finding and siting 
two weapons heavy enough to break up the attack. This same 
division commander, Generalmajor Neumann-Silkow, would be wounded 
by shell fragments in an advanced position next to his· armored 
command vehicle on 7 December 1941 and die of his wounds two days 
later. 
34. 15.Pz.D., Ia, KTB Nr. 2, Seite 10, 23.11.41, U.S., Archives, 
German Records, T-313, Roll 664, Fr. 000428. 
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CHAPTER 3 
OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL OBSERVATIONS 
ON THE GERMAN CONDUCT OF WAR IN THE DESERT 
Commentators often break down the conduct of war by military 
leaders into strategy, operations, and tactics. From such a 
view, strategy stands as a high level, cerebral art that defines 
the higher level goals of war in theaters of military operations 
and is susceptible to analysis in terms of principle or rule. In 
a war, the goals of strategy can be gained only by the armed 
violence associated with the military operation and the battles 
comprising it. Military operations and the inclusive battles are 
less susceptible to control in terms of principle and rule. 
Lying in the realm of armed violence, operations and the battles 
comprising them tend to march to the drumbeat of the climate of 
the armed violence of war - - danger, exertion, uncertainty, and 
chance. In such a scheme, the military operation comprises the 
battles strung together in given space and time to achieve a set 
of strategic goals. Operational art becomes the art of stringing 
those battles together to achieve prescribed strategic goals. 
Battles armed encounters, engagements, maneuvers, and strikes 
- - are the realm of tactics. In the conventional arrangement of 
strategy, operations, and tactics, the latter stands out as the 
art of fighting battles. 
In North Africa in 1941-42, Rommel and the staff of Panzer 
Army Africa practiced operational art with a style that can be 
characterized by the words quick tempo, decisive objective, and 
continuous movement. In contrast with Soviet operational art 
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today in which the Soviets tout a systematic approach and various 
recipes involving correlation of force for success, the Germans 
recognized the uniqueness and danger in every operation and a 
resulting style characterized by the observation of one German 
genera1 35 that in danger there is always opportunity. If the 
soviets attempt today to take uncertainty and chance out of the 
conduct of the military operation by systematic, quantifiable, 
rule-book addressal to every contingency, the Germans overcame 
the same factors by making quicker decisions from more advanced 
positions seeking opportunity in the province of chance and 
taking advantage of it. The Germans were painstaking and thor-
ough in the putting together of their operations when in posses-
sion of the initiative on the offensive. The Germans systemati-
cally (i.e., always) employed Planspielen or command conferences 
in which they calculated the difficulties of an anticipated 
operation but never confused the game with the reality of the 
violence and uncertainty of war. 
During the time covered by this study, Rommel and his staff 
orchestrated their first operation in the period 18 November - 7 
December 1941 as a reaction to the British Crusader Offensive. 
This German "operation" was not planned by Rommel and his staff, 
but rather it was forced on Panzer Army Africa by the British. 
Under surprise attack by an enemy numerically superior on the 
ground and in the air, Rommel had the clear strategic goal to 
35. An observation of then Generalmajor Fritz Erich van Manstein 
during the Polish Campaign (!). Manstein seems to be saying that 
lesser minds and characters see only danger in danfger, react 
accordingly and attempt to remove danger in advance by adherence 
to rule or principle. 
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' 
avoid the destruction of his own army and thereby prevent the 
seizure of Libya and the ending of the war in North Africa. 
Rommel and his staff faced the sudden prospects of linking to-
gether several battles - - one around Tobrulic, another farther 
east on the frontier defenses, and the largest of all among the 
opposing mobile forces in the area between the siege lines of 
Tobruk and the defenses on the frontier between Sollum and Sidi 
Omar. Just what style of operations did the Germans reveal in 
coordinating these battles in the desert against a superior 
enemy? 
First of all, for two days, 18, 19 November 1941, Rommel and 
his staff mistook the purpose of the strong British reconnais-
sance forces that had driven close to the Tobruk siege lines by 
the evening of the latter day. Rommel optimistically dismissed 
the activity as a reconnaissance to clarify German intentions 
relative to the impending German attack on Tobruk. The Panzer 
Army staff estimated the situation as late as the evening of 19 
November as one in which the British were attempting to disrupt 
the German preparations. Rommel and his staff did not a~curately 
gauge the situation until the afternoon of 20 November when it 
became "apparent that the enemy had not only set out on a relief 
thrust to Tobruk but on a great general offensive. 1136 In effect, 
the German command did not react to the actual great offensive of 
the enemy until the evening of the third day. Rommel showed 
36. Pz. ACK Africa, Ia, Schlachtbericht der Panzerarmee Afrika, 
den 20.11.41, U.S., Archives, German Records, Panzer Armies, T-
313, Roll 430, Fr. 8723063. 
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considerable energy during this period, however, approving the 
DAK order to commit the 21st Panzer Division alone on 19 November 
against the vastly underestimated British mobile force. Fortu-
nately for the Germans, 21st Panzer Division did not contact the 
main strength of the British tank forces. The next day, 20 
November, the OAK finally concentrated 15th and 21th Panzer 
Divisions. The same day, Rommel realized the presence of a grand 
British offense and began the operation from the German side. 
During the first several days, 18-20 November 1941, of the 
British advance, the Germans groped for a British mobile force of 
uncertain dimensions. The Germans groped in open, level desert 
for the British moving with a mobile force that had a pool of 
approximately 500 cruiser-type tanks and 250 armed reconnaissance 
vehicles available for the advance. It is a notable point that 
the British motorized forces in desert terrain rather than being 
vulnerable to detection were extremely difficult for the Germans 
to find. Panzer Army command had three Panzer reconnaissance 
battalions under its direct operational control, elements of two 
panzer divisions, and other forces including aerial reconnais-
sance assets airborne in spite of substantial British air control 
and skilled radio intercept units all dedicated to finding the 
British but none having decisive success. 
Rommel and his staff began to practice operational art on 21 
November 1941 by stringing together three battles forced on them 
by the British attack. Panzer Army Command sent out orders daily 
from this point on to the two static battles developing around 
Tobruk and Sollum. The orders came out in a consistent, firm, 
succinct pattern, for example, on the evening of 21 November: 
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"XXth Army Corps hold Tobruk front," just as simple as that. 
Rommel knew that a collapse of his predominately Italian forces 
either at Tobruk or around Sollum would jeopardize full success 
in the unsolicited operation developing around him. Well aware 
of the danger surrounding him by 21 November, Rommel, as his 
actions show over the course of the operation, sensed that the 
opportunity offered itself to defeat the British field army. In 
effect, Rommel began by 21 November to link together the battles 
into a German operation that had the strategic goal to def eat the 
British mobile force (i.e., the tank formations) and drive into 
Egypt with the correlated possibility of the collapse of the 
British in North Africa. 
After directing hard fighting on the morning of 22 November 
1941 in the Tobruk battle that kept the British contained in the 
fortress, Rommel made the bold decision to drive the OAK concen-
trically into the main concentration of British armor in North 
Africa now lying southeast of Tobruk. In the resulting fighting 
that took place around Sidi Rezegh, the OAK and the Italian XXth 
Motorized Corps blocking from the southwest inf lict~d heavy 
losses on the British mobile force. On the evening of 22 Novem-
ber 1942, pacing his whole operation to the battle with the 
British mobile force, Rommel ordered the OAK to continue the 
attack around Sidi Rezegh with the specific intention to encircle 
the armored forces and destroy them. On 23 November, the two 
German panzer divisions continued to show tactical superiority 
over the opposing British, and won another great victory inflict-
ing heavy losses on the British armor and forcing the intact 
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elements to the southeast away from Tobruk. At the same moment 
the Italo-German force outside of Tobruk had successfully fought 
its battle to contain the British, and the Italo-German force 
between Sollum and Sidi Omar was hard pressed in its battle but 
still successfully blocking any British advance along the sea 
westward to Tobruk. Rommel believed in the evening of 23 Novem-
ber 1942 that he had won the operation. He believed he had done 
so through his active success in the battle against the British 
armor and stabilization of the fronts in the two defensive bat-
tles. 
German Tactics in the Desert: 
Preoccupation with Tanks 
Studies on German battle fighting on the offensive in World 
War II tend to emphasize maneuver as the key element in German 
success in mobile wars. Studies on a bold, successful commander 
such as Rommel in North Africa tend to describe his genius also 
in terms of maneuver particularly in open, level desert. This 
study, which included the perusal of approximately 14,000 pages 
of records of Panzer Army Africa and the 15th and 21st Panzer 
Divisions, detected a special German skill in tactical maneuver 
in agreement with the established conventional wisdom on the 
subject. As the researcher continued to examine the large volume 
of material, he also came across an unmistakable, perhaps unique, 
German preoccupation with weapons in North Africa. The research-
er had observed in an earlier study of the offensive battles of a 
panzer division in France (1940) and Russia (1941) a similar 
special emphasis on weapons. In North Africa in 1941 and 1942, 
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, ..... 
the German forces showed a sensitivity to the numbers and quali-
ties of their own weapons that was exaggerated beyond that shown 
on the European continent. The reason for this is probably that 
in the open desert, the Germans witnessed that the gun tended to 
dominate the man and to give special protection against even the 
tank. In a return to observations once made but now largely 
disappeared from the literature, the research could not help but 
notice the similarity between war at sea where gun and machine 
dominate over man, and war in the desert in similar open, traf-
f icable "terrain" and the supremacy of the motorized force and 
associated guns over the rifleman. 
The Germans identified the tank as the key weapon and the 
panzer division as the key war fighting organization in North 
Africa. In its engagement report on the Crusader battles from 18 
November-7 December 1941, 5th Panzer Regiment, 21st Panzer Divi-
sion, gave daily accounts of each tank lost and the strength in 
tanks for insertion in battle (Einstzbereit) . On 17 November, 
for example, 5th Panzer Regiment had ready for action the follow-
ing tanks representing the entire strength of 21st Panzer Divi-
sion: 37 
5th Panzer Rgt, 21st Panzer Div (17 Nov 41) 
' 
a. Panzer II - - - - - 35 
b. Panzer III - - - - 68 A total of 124 
c. Panzer IV - - - - - - - - - 17 recon_, battle, and 
d. Panzer III (Bef.) * 4 command tanks 
*Bef. or Bef ehlswagen (Command Vehicle) . 
On 17 November 1941, the German Command - - the commanders 
37. 21.Pz.D., Ia, Anlage zum KTB Nr. 2, Gefechtsbericht, Pz.R.5, 
17.11-31.12.41, Seite 1. U.S. Archives, German Records, Divi-
sions, T-313, Roll 767, Fr. 000213. 
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and staff of the Panzer Army, DAK, and the 21st Panzer Division -
- based its estimate of the "striking power" of 21st Panzer 
Division almost exclusively on the 124 tanks held by 5th Panzer 
Regiment. The same division could defend itself effectively 
without a single tank through use of its complement of artillery, 
Pak and Flak and while fighting from field fortifications. To be 
a factor of significance in maneuver and attack, however, 21st 
Panzer Division required tanks. The Germans had invented the 
first modern combined arms team in their panzer divisions of 1935 
and were dedicated to the concept notably in terms of the ad hoc 
Kampfgruppen that they put together so often in World War II. 
Tanks, in fact, even in the open desert, could not be expected to 
advance effectively against opposing forces with strong artil-
lery, Pak, and pioneer assets without combined arms tactics. 
Knowing all of this, the Germans also knew that the Panzer Army 
could not conduct mobile warfare without the tank and that the 
capability of the army to maneuver and advance in North Africa 
could be measured both tactically and technically in terms of the 
number of tanks Einsatzbereit (ready for insertion in ba~tle). 
Rommel, for example, conducted the great multi-battle 
operation of 18 November - 7 December 1941, based largely on the 
tactical capabilities of OAK and its two panzer divisions. The 
two panzer divisions functioned, in turn, according to the number 
of tanks available for maneuver by skilled commanders and combat 
by skilled crews in combination with other arms. The acute 
German sensitivity to the importance of the tank shows in the 
daily accounting of the standing in tanks. The Germans recorded 
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three bits of information about their tanks that allowed Rommel 
and Panzer Group Staff to gauge both the tactical and operational 
possibilities of the Crusader situation. In 21st Panzer Division 
the Germans painstakingly identified the numbers of tanks totally 
lost, the numbers of tanks not ready for action but under repair 
and in process of being returned to service, and the number of 
tanks at any point in time ready for action (Einstzbereit). 
The German situation in tanks was the most decisive measure 
of German exertion in the Crusader fighting. The situation 
allows the reader as well as it allowed Rommel and his commanders 
and staff in 1941 to gauge the course of the fighting and to 
relate the tactical situation with the remaining operational 
possibilities at any point in time. Beginning with 124 tanks on 
17 November 1941, 21st Panzer Division lost tanks in the 
following pattern in the period 18-23 November 1941, the period 
in which the German mobile force groped for the British and at 
the end of which it fought a great tank battle which Rommel 
sensed gave him victory in his operation: 
21st Panzer Division 
Tanks Totally Lost (accumulated 18-23 Nov 41) (catas-
trophically destroyed or immobilized and lying in enemy 
territory) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 42 
Tanks in Repair (situation 2200 23 Nov 41) (complex 
picture with approx half due for return from 1-48 hours 
later) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 50 
Tanks Combat Ready (situation 2200 23 Nov 41) - - - - - - 32 
Tanks Total - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 124 
As a result of the tank battles of 22, 23 November 1941, 
21st Panzer Division stood on the evening of the latter day with 
only 32 tanks ready for combat on 24 November. The German situa-
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tion was even more disastrous than it appears. Of the 32 
remaining tanks, 5th Panzer Regiment could use only 18 in tank 
versus tank combat because ll of the operating vehicles were 
lightly armored, 10-ton Panzer II tanks armed with a 20mm cannon 
and three additional vehicles were sophisticated command tanks 
with dummy wooden gun barrels and armed only with two machine 
guns. Early on the morning of 24 November 1942, Rommel neverthe-
less became convinced that he had defeated the British mobile 
force. As a result he faced the grand operational problem of how 
to transform the victory in the great mobile battle into victory 
in the operation forced on him by the British offensive. In a 
v 
mole unequaled in boldness by any army-level commander in World 
War II, Rommel determined to thrust to the Egyptian border with 
the two German panzer divisions under his personal command. With 
only 32 tanks in 21st Panzer Division and 65 tanks in 15th Panzer 
Division and prospects of rapidly dwindling numbers as he out-
stripped his overburdened repair companies, Rommel had little 
possibility of finishing off the British mobile force and de-
stroying the British field army in Libya. 
On 26 November 1941, after a fruitless three days of march, 
countermarch, and moderate combat south of Sollum along the 
Egyptian frontier, Rommel under the prompting of the Panzer Group 
staff directed the two panzer divisions back to Sidi Rezegh. The 
staff made it clear to Rommel that the Tobruk battle had turned 
critically to the disadvantage of the Germans and the nearly 
beaten British mobile force had begun to recover southeast of 
Tobruk in the open desert. on the morning of 27 November 1941, 
back in the area of the earlier great mobile battle, Rommel found 
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himself in possession of an army whose striking power lay in 30 
combat ready tanks of the returning 21st Panzer Division and 54 
tanks of 15th Panzer Divisions. From 27 November - 7 December 
1941, Rommel directed numerous engagements and encounters in the 
closely linked battle southeast of Tobruk and the great battle 
with the recovered British mobile force in the desert. As the 
tank numbers indicate, Rommel did not have the strength in tanks 
to bring the German operation to a successful conclusion by a 
second more decisive defeat of the British armor. When Rommel 
began to withdraw on 7 December 1941 toward El Agheila 500 miles 
away, the 21st Panzer Division reported 20 tanks ready for combat 
and the 15th Panzer Division 30 tanks. Panzer Army Africa spe-
cifically held the following tanks on that day ready for combat: 38 
Panzer Group Africa C7 Dec 41) Combat Ready Tanks* 
a. Panzer II 
- - - -
10 (Recon Tanks) 
b. Panzer III - - - - - - - - - 28 
c. Panzer IV 
- - - - - - - - - -
8 
d. Panzer III (Bef.) 4 (Command Tanks) 
Total 50 tanks 
*A total of only 36 battle tanks. 
With only 36 German battle tanks remaining, Rommel and 
Panzer Group Africa had no realistic chance of operational 
victory in Eastern Libya. Rommel now sought the operational goal 
of successful withdrawal of his shattered Italo-German force 
38. 15.Pz.D., Ia, KTB Nr. 2, 7.12.41, U.S., Archives, German 
Records, Divisions, T-313, Roll 664, Fr. 000505, and 21.Pz.D, Ia, 
Anlagen zum KlrB Nr. 2, Gefechtsbericht, Pz.R.5, 6.12.41, U.S., 
Archives, German Records, Divisions, T-313, Roll 767, Fr. 000229. 
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based on rear guard battles strung along from Tobruk all the way 
to El Agheila. Rommel would employ rear guard Kampfqruppen built 
around small tank detachments combined with strong Flak and Pak 
elements to prevent the British from breaking directly through 
his forces or outflanking them to the south out of the open 
desert. He had enough tanks remaining after 7 December 1941 to 
conduct this operation but little more. 
German Tactics in the Desert: 
Preoccupation With Flak (Antiaircraft Guns) 
Rommel and Panzer Army Africa faced heavy odds in open 
desert terrain in 1941-42. The British field army, the famed 8th 
Army, drastically outnumbered the German forces in the Italo-
German Panzer Army in almost every weapon. British numerical 
superiority included greater numbers of tanks, antitank guns, 
field artillery pieces, antiaircraft guns, and combat aircraft 
including fighters, low-level attack aircraft, and medium bomb-
ers. The British field army significantly outnumbered the ~ 
bined Italo-German forces in the same categories of weapons. As 
concerns the question of technology and specifically' weapons 
performance characteristics, the British field army held weapons 
that were similar in performance to those of the Germans and 
superior to those of the Italians. Argument continues to rage on 
the question of technology, but the generalization above holds 
even in the face of the complex technological picture. The 
British complain that their 40mm tank cannon was smaller that the 
German 50mm and 75mm tank cannon with implied technical superior-
ity for the Germans. The British had designed, however, a small-
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er cannon that was so good technologically that it matched the 
armor penetration capabilities of the larger German tank 
cannons. 39 Most of the technological analyses end similarly in 
closely balanced characteristics such as those between the Brit-
ish and German tank cannons. 
Rommel and the German elements in Panzer Army Africa faced 
an uncomfortable situation in which they were drastically outnum-
bered and held no counterbalancing advantage in technology. The 
Italian elements in the Panzer Army reduced the numerical inferi-
ority but added an element of technological inferiority that 
reduced the effect. In the fighting during the period covered by 
this study, the two German divisions of the OAK would do the bulk 
of the fighting in both the great defensive battles of Crusader 
z 
(November-December 1941) and the offensive operation of Venelia 
(May-June 42) because of their superior mobility. The following 
listing illustrates the adverse balance for the Panzer Army and 
the heavier responsibilities of the OAK in the mobile battles: 
Adverse Balance for Germans 18 Nov 41, Crusader Battles) 
Weapon German Italian British 
a. Tanks 260 154 648 
b. Pz Recon* 33 24 646 
c. Pak 94 195 312 
d. Flak 128 112 300 
*Armored Reconnaissance Vehicles. 
39. British 40mm L/52 Tank: 56mm at 500m; German SOmm L/42 Tank: 
63mm at 500m; German 75mm L/24 tank: 54mm at 500m. See in F.M. 
von Senger und Etterlin, Die Kampfpanzer von 1916-1066 (Muenchen, 
1971) f PP• 515, 516. 
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The listing shows that the Italians, who had approximately 
three times as many men as the Germans in North Africa, would not 
be able to do an equivalent share of the armored warfare that 
would so completely dominate the theater. The Germans would 
conduct the mobile war significantly to the exclusion of the 
Italians based on the relatively small numbers and weak perform-
ance characteristics of the Italian armor and other weapons of 
the Italian XXth Motorized Corps that was only put together a 
week before the British Crusader Offensive. Accepting this 
analysis, the researcher suggests an operational picture in North 
Africa in which a German armored force with 299 tanks and armored 
reconnaissance vehicles assisted by a much smaller, tactically 
and technically deficient coalition force, faced a British ar-
mored force of approximately 1,112 technically similar vehicles. 
Rommel and the German forces of the Italo-German field army faced 
the adverse numerical situation illustrated above from the begin-
ning of their deployment to North Africa. The adverse situation 
was compounded by British air superiority in open, level desert 
terrain. The Germans became preoccupied with Flak from the 
beginning of the campaign in North Africa to redress the adverse 
situation described above. 
As early as April 1941, Rommel sited a handful of the 88mm 
Flak in the German Africa Corps40 in static strong points between 
Sollum and Sidi Omar on the Egyptian frontier. With his front 
40. Official name for German forces in North Africa from 9 Febru-
ary-15 August 1941. On 15 August 1941, the force was designated 




line instincts and imagination, Rommel sensed the value of the 
cannon as a heavy antitank weapon (Pak). The British at this 
time also had an infantry support tank, the "Matilda" Mark II, a 
relatively heavy tank at 26 tons with 80mm of armor liberally 
distributed over the fronts and sides of the hull and turret. 
The Germans had no Pak in the middle of 1941 that could penetrate 
the 80mm armor on this tank. By the beginning of the Crusader 
Offensive, the Germans had placed 23 of the total of 35 88mm Flak 
in North Africa with the Italo-German forces on the Sollum front. 
By the same time, the Germans realized that the gun system with 
its three-quarter tracked towing vehicle and four-wheel gun 
carrier and trailer from which it could be fired, was mobile 
enough to accompany the tank formations in battle. During the 
Crusader battles, the Germans would employ the 88mm Flak in 
support of numerous Kampfgruppen in what the Germans called the 
Panzerbegleit, or tank escort, role. 
In the Flak regiments of the day, the Germans had both 88mm 
and 20mm guns organized into batteries. In combat in the desert, 
the Germans used the 88m Flak batteries predominately in the 
antitank role. The 20mm Flak batteries in contrast provided most 
of the Flak air defense for the German mobile divisions - -
specifically 15th Panzer, 21st Panzer, and 90th Light Africa 
Division during the period of this study. The Germans also had 
mixed batteries of 88 and 20mm Flak which they used predominately 
as antitank units. The Germans found quickly by experience that 
the 20mm guns were nimble weapons systems with high rates of fire 
that proved to be effective against the low level air attacks 
that were most dangerous to the mobile formations. The Germans 
so 
also found that the 20nun Flak firing the armor piercing round was 
capable of knocking out any of the British armored reconnaissance 
vehicles and other similar light armored vehicles. The 20nun Flak 
firing the high explosive round also proved to be extremely 
effective against trucks and similar unarmored vehicles and also 
effective against infantry. The Germans, as a result, commonly 
~~d 
employed the 20mm Flak batteries .. detached platoons to screen 
and fight off British reconnaissance units and similar light 
forces. 
Beginning in 1930, the Germans developed the 88mm Flak used 
by the Germans in World War II and thoughtfully put together a 
family of ammunition and fuzes that permitted the Flak to fire 
effectively against air, ground, and heavy ground armored tar-
gets. As a result, the German Flak batteries in North Africa 
could fire two types of projectiles and fuzes against tanks, and 
several additional type of high explosive projectiles and fuzes 
against ground and air targets. The Germans used high explosive 
projectiles with instantaneous and delay nose fuzes and clockwork 
nose fuzes for various effects against ground targets. ~hey used 
exclusively clockwork fuzes with 88nun high explosive projectiles 
against aircraft. The Germans could shift direct fire among 
different targets immediately simply by loading the appropriate 
ammunition and using the appropriate sights. The gun could also 
be fired from its four-wheel trailer-carrier. Towed by an 8-ton, 
three-quarter tracked towing vehicle, the 88mm Flak organized 
generally into 4-gun batteries, had the off-road mobility in 
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desert terrain to move forward with the German tank regiments and 
support them by direct fire. 
By 1942, the Germans had a succinct set of guiding princi-
-
ples for the insertion in battle of the heavy ssmm Flak batter-
ies. Headquarters, DAK, advised on 22 May 1942 that German 
forces should consider inserting the heavy batteries as antiair-
craft units, tank escort units, or ground firing units, the 
latter especially for shooting at ranges between 8-14km. The 
German directive noted the flexibility of the batteries in shift-
ing targets and mission, commenting specifically that an 88mm 
Flak battery set up to fire at air targets could shift "immedi-
ately" to firing against armored and ground targets. 41 HQ, DAK 
continued in characteristic German style to state that the heavy 
Flak batteries should be inserted in combat together notwith-
standing the target - - air, armored, or ground. The directive 
warned that the temptation must especially be resisted to provide 
single BBmm Flak for the hard fighting and hard begging motorized 
infantry units because the guns would end up as targets too far 
forward and too big to escape losses from enemy infantry. The 
directive continued that the heavy Flak batteries did not have 
the mobility necessary to keep up with the reconnaissance battal-
ions and should be used only sparingly with them. The directive 
ends on the tantalizing generality that "the insertion of the 
41. 15.Pz.D., Ia, KTB Nr.3, Anlagen c, Deutsches Afrika Korps, 
Ia/Flak, Richtlinien fuer den Einsatz von Flak - Batterien, 
22.5.1942, U.S., Archives, German Records, Divisions, T-313, Roll 
666, Fr. 001446,47. 
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samm tank escort battery succeeds as a rule on a wing of the tank 
force by achieving flanking fire against the enemy. 11 42 
With their mobile divisions, the Germans had considerable 
success with the self-propelled 2 omm ~ (Army designa.tion for 
Flak) companies of the army. 
v.i1+h 
.,Atruck-towed 20mm 
were d1ll'/tl)/f. +o 
Army columnstl protect"9 
Flak against low level air attack because 
f.ooK 
guns ·•••••••••·-~ time to get into a firing mode. 
the 
In 
defensive positions, either towed or self propelled 20mm Flak ... 
could {11·e lff!Med1Qtely 
&LES& J UA against air attack. The Germans found that the light 
Flak batteries (and army companies) were effective against the 
British armored reconnaissance vehicles at ranges below aoom. 
-lowed 
The Germans as a doctrinal procedure in North Africa had theA 20mm 
Flak go into firing positions during the halt of mobile columns. 
With forces on the move in combat, the Germans placed the guns of 
the light Flak battery on the outside of the combat formations 
whenever possible. 
Fighting against a numerically superior enemy with strong 
air forces, Panzer Army Africa was forced to use Flak to protect 
its mobile force from excessive damage and casualties and to 
maintain its capability to maneuver in the face of low ievel air 
attack. The Germans had strong air forces in North Africa but 
not enough to provide full cover over their marching columns or 
engaged forces. Between 19 November-15 December 1941, the Com-
manding General, 15th Panzer Division, used his attached 5th 
Battery, Flak Regiment 33, to support several organic battalions 
of the division in combat against the British during the Crusader 
42. Ibid., Fr. 001447. 
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battles. The battery was a light one armed with 20mm Flak and 
would support, for example, the division machine gun and motorcy-
cle battalions and some of the artillery battalions. The battery 
fought numerous actions during this time period that illustrate 
the necessity for light automatic cannon with mobile forces 
operating in the desert today against strong opposition. 
19~/ 
On 19 November ...._, 15th Panzer Division began to move into 
its "alarm areas" (Alarmraeume) and the Flak battery moved in 
support of a marching column. At 1630, six British Bristol-
Blenheim light bombers began attacks on the column. Two platoons 
of the battery went into firing positions to fight off the bomb-
ers and fired 370 rounds of high explosive, nose-fuzed instanta-
neous projectiles against them. Faced with this moderate Flak 
fire from the ground, the British did not press home their at-
tacks effectively and caused little damage or delay to the Ger-
mans. 43 This pedestrian action, which is similar to numerous 
other fights in the German records, suggests that moderate Flak 
defenses based on light automatic cannon with their spectacular 
tracer effects as well as real damage capabilities can generally 
provide adequate defense against serious air attack. 
The 5th Battery, Flak Regiment 35 had its hands full during 
the Crusader battles and its actions also illustrate the extent 
to which an opposing air force can intervene on the ground even 
when friendly air assets remain intact and fairly strong. on 20 
43. Bristol-Blenheim: Three-seat, two-engine, ground attack 
style aircraft with 1,000-pound internal bomb load and three 
machine guns able to be directed in strafing. 
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November 1942, two platoons of 20nun Flak in support of the march-
ing columns of the division motorcycle and machine gun battalions 
went into firing positions twice in the morning and once in the 
afternoon firing off 445 rounds of high explosive ammunition 
against British fighters armed for ground attack. The next day, 
21 November, the 2d Platoon of the Flak battery and the machine 
gun battalion it was supporting came under attack by 16 British 
armored reconnaissance vehicles. the Germans drove the British 
off in a late afternoon action but the Flak platoon lost one 20nun 
gun and its towing truck. Other columns supported by the battery 
came under low level air attack three times during the day. In a 
substantial success, the battery shot down one British Hurricane 
fighter armed for ground attack. The battery fired 716 high 
explosive and 56 armor piercing rounds in support of the division 
moves. 44 The action on 21 November was less pedestrian and shows 
a 20mm Flak battery flexibility engaging light armored targets on 
the ground and successfully engaging more determined enemy fight-
er bombers. 
The 5th Battery, Flak Regiment 33, fought actions in a 
similar pattern during the rest of the period of the 'crusader 
battles. The Flak battery met its biggest challenge on 23 Novem-
ber 1941 in a day of violent fighting and chance encounter in-
volving combat against British infantry, tanks, and attacking 
aircraft. At 0930, 4th Platoon, in a sudden chance encounter 
with British infantry in trucks destroyed one armored machine gun 
carrier, several trucks, and took 20 prisoners. Later in the 
44. Ibid., Fr. 000321,22. 
55 
day, the 20mm Flak of two of the platoons supported attacks of 
the machine gun and motorcycle battalions against British infan-
try and machine gun and antitank gun positions. At 1745 in the 
afternoon, in a wild melee among the mobile forces engaged in the 
desert, the 20mm Flak faced British cruiser tanks at close range. 
The battery commander himself pulled the 4th platoon around to 
one flank of the local British tank attack and immobilized one 
Mark IV cruiser tank with 20mm armor piercing rounds fired 
through the sides and rear. Fifteen minutes later, the platoon 
engaged two Mark IV cruiser tanks which suddenly appeared from 
another direction and catastrophically destroyed one with 20mm 
armor piercing projectiles that caused a fire and explosions on 
the inside of the tank. The battery also engaged infantry in 
trucks, and deployed on the ground in and among the British 
tanks, and had taken by around 1900, 250 prisoners. In one of 
the last engagements of the day the battery commander with the 
12th gun of the battery engaged a British armored reconnaissance 
vehicle and another Mark IV cruiser tank at short range, immobi-
lized both with gunfire, and took the crews prisoner.. During 
this same busy day, the battery defended against air attack three 
times during the late afternoon by a total of about 17 British 
Bristol-Blenheim light bombers. The intensity of the fighting 
and the flexibility of the battery is exemplified by the expendi-
ture of 2,240 rounds of 20mm HE and 570 rounds of AP ammunition, 
and the expenditure of 150 rounds of machine gun ammunition and 
60 rounds of machine pistol ammunition by the Flak crews. 
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During the same period of time, 3rd Battery, Flak Regiment 
33, a heavy battery with 4 samm and 4 20mm Flak, supported the 
1st Battalion, Panzer Regiment 8, of the division. Attached to 
the tank regiment, the battery was employed in the tank escort 
role rather than air defense. The battery commander would employ 
his guns with great flexibility often firing at ground targets of 
opportunity. On 23 November 1941, the battery commander deployed 
two ssmm Flak on the left and two additional on the right flank 
of the panzer regiment in support of a morning attack against 
concentrations of British tanks, truck columns, and infantry. 
The battery fired both impact-fuzed and time-fuzed air burst 
rounds against British truck and infantry targets and armor 
piercing rounds against tanks, immobilizing four Mark IV cruiser 
tanks and destroying approximately 20 trucks. 45 Later, in the 
afternoon, the battery advanced on the left flank of the tank 
regiment but so close to the British that it could not set up to 
fire because of British rifle and machine gun fire. Toward the 
end of the day, the panzer regiment disengaged the battery and 
inserted it into a gap that had developed on the left between it 
and the neighboring Italian Ariete tank division. In the block-
ing role, the Flak battery destroyed 5 British Mark IV cruiser 
tanks with the firing of 66 rounds of AP ammunition as the enemy 
tried to exploit the gap. The battery lost two men killed and 
eight wounded as well as a tracked towing machine and a carriage 
for one of the asmm guns totally destroyed. 
45. 15.Pz.D., Ia, KTB Nr . 2, Gefechtsbericht der 3./Flak 33, 
19.11.15.12.41, U.S., Archives, German Records, Divisions, T-313, 
Roll 666, Fr. 000341, 42. 
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In the fighting on 21 November 1941, the heavy Flak battery 
effected an interesting tactic that is worth noting. The battery 
was in positions in and among the tanks of Panzer Regiment 8 that 
were engaged with strong British tank units. After about one 
hour of combat, the German tanks found themselves short of 
ammunition and forced to break off the battle. The British 
sensed the German disadvantage and pressed their attack as the 
German tanks began to withdraw. The Flak battery commander 
recognized the situation also and on his own initiative kept his 
four 88mm guns in firing position and brought to bear enough fire 
to halt the British tanks. The battery commander had established 
spontaneously a "Flak screen" behind which the friendly tanks 
could disengage and take on ammunition. 
German Tactics in the Desert: - -
Preoccupation With Pak (Antitank Guns) 
Faced with British numerical superiority in tanks from the 
day of their arrival in Africa early in February 1941, the Ger-
mans needed every antitank gun they could lay their hands on. 
During the first several months, the German Forces in Libya would 
have a relatively small number of Pak weapons and more than half 
would be the modern looking and exceptionally agile 37mm Pak. By 
1941, however, based on their experience in the brief but tough 
French campaign in which they had suffered 156,000 casualties, 
the Germans knew that the gun was outmoded. In France, the 
German 37mm Pak crews had not be able to knock out virtually any 
of the French light, medium, or heavy tanks, all of which had 
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large surface areas protected by 40wn or somewhat greater thick-
nesses of armor. The Germans met in France 
first time on 21 May 1940, the British Mark 
near Cambrai for the 
mfantty 
II (Matilda)/\ support 
tanks whose sown armor was completely impervious to the 37mm AP 
projectiles. In Africa, the Pak battalions of the panzer divi-
sions would again meet the Mark II (Matilda) and Mark III (Valen-
tine) heavily armored infantry support tanks with little or no 
prospects of damaging these vehicles. Against the more numerous 
British cruiser tanks in the British tank divisions, the 37wn Pak 
would be more effective in getting through the 30mm to 40mm 
frontal armor of the vehicles at short range but would still be a 
marginal weapon. German Pak crews during the French campaign had 
already begun to refer to the 37wn Pak as "the Army's doorknock-
er" -- most of the doors would be more solid in 1941 against the 
British in the desert. 
Earlier, in 1938, the Germans had already begun to develop a 
replacement for the light Pak designated ultimately the Scm Pak 
38 and considered by the Germans in 1941 to be a "heavy" Pak 
weapon. The somm Pak was a vast improvement but still only a 
partial answer to the British armor. With an armor perforation 
capability at l,OOOm range of 6lmm at a 30-degree angle of lbliq-
uity, the sown Pak dominated all of the British cruiser tanks at 
i,ooom, the Mark III fValentine) to approximately aoom, but 
continued to have little effect against the Mark II (Matilda) at 
any range. Rommel and his staff worked feverishly to get the 
heavier gun into Africa. They pressed the Army High Command 
{OKH) for additional imaginative stop gaps and successfully 
supplemented the gradually arriving new sown Pak with the innova-
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tive 47mm Pak built in Czechoslovakia in small numbers and mount-
- Fot IJt~ as e111r/1f. r1K ?Vl'IS1 
ed on a German Panzer I light tank chassis.A Rommel and his staff 
also managed to extract from OKH large numbers of Soviet 76.2mm 
field guns that had been captured along with huge stocks of 
ammunition in the summer of 1941. •lM!l~&~n ... t•l ..... p•EM~p ....... u•smil!&~s~s!lllml-. ...... 1
&tlld&fot± g a The Germans even converted significant numbers of 
f/,e 
~ famed but ancient French model 1897 75mm field guns into antitank 
guns by cleverly placing them on various available SOmm Pak 
carriages and using French ammunition. Working in this manner, 
Rommel and his staff had managed to scrape together the following 








Panzer Group German Pak {16 Nov 41) 46 
Weapon 
37mm Pak 35/36 - - - - - - - - -
47mm Pak (Czech) Self Propelled) 
somm Pak 38- - - - - - - - - - -
75mm Model 97 (French) - - -
76.2mm 36/39 (Russian) - - - - -










Soon to be attacked on 18 November 1941 by approximately 750 
British tanks (including 100 out of the Tobruk fortress), the 
Germans faced hard questions of survival from the viewpoint of 
46. Pz. AOK Afrika, .lg, Anlage zum KTB, Panzergruppe Panzerabwehr-
waffen, 16.11.41, U.S., Archives, German Records, Panzer Armies, 
T-313, Roll 423, Fr. 8716049, 50. 
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antitank defense. How would the Germans avoid decisive defeat in 
November and indeed come close to winning the operation? 
The answer comes from several directions. The Italians 
contributed a large number of Pak weapons although the bulk was 
located around Tobruk and Sollum and never able to be used 
against the tanks of the British mobile force. The Italian XXth 
Motorized corps contributed substantially to the mobile battle 
and held around 120 Italian 47mm Pak with moderate armor perfora-
tion capabilities. The German 88mm Flak proved to be outrageous-
ly effective based on some combination of technical excellence 
and bold, uninhibited tactical handling. Although the OAK fought 
with only 12 of these guns, the ssmm Flak goes a significant way 
toward explaining the survival of the Panzer Group. The Germans 
handled their own Pak, finally, in ways that help to explain 
their successes in the battle. 
Similarly to the thoroughness and tactical awareness in the 
design of the ssmm Flak 36, the Germans developed a high explo-
sive round for the SOmm Pak. They also developed a sophisticated 
charre 
antitank round with a delay fuze that set off a small ' s in a 
heavy-walled penetrator that exploded behind the armor, i.e., 
often inside the enemy vehicle. Armed with high explosive 
ammunition, German somm Pak units could engage British infantry 
in the open, in field fortifications, and manning machine gun and 
mortar positions. Armed with such ammunition, somm Pak units 
could more effectively destroy British trucks and also knock out 
British armored reconnaissance vehicles. The Pak units even 
forced the shifting of British artillery positions in some en-
gagements through use of high explosive rounds. The Germans also 
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r 
had large quantities of high explosive projectiles for the large 
number of 106 Russian 76.2mm Pak that had been converted from the 
Russian field gun and inserted in North Africa by May 1942. 47 
Early in 1942, the Germans continued to press for antitank 
guns and Rommel requested the outfitting of each of the six 
motorized rifle companies of the motorized infantry regiments of 
the panzer division with six SOmm Pak 38. The statistic is 
impressive. Rommel and his staff saw the war in the desert 
dominated to such a degree by the tank and 
vehicle that they decided to place six 
armored reconnaissance 
P each 
somm ~ inA~•, •_ ... 1 .. 3_•1•• 
German infantry company. The OKH approved the new outfitting of 
the companies on 12 May 1942. Two months later in July 1942, as 
the Germans began to put together a fourth division for employ-
ment in Africa - - the 164th Infantry Division - - OKH and Panzer 
Army Africa agreed on an outfitting level of 196 somm Pak 38 for 
the new organization. 48 These are heady numbers of antitank guns. 
The Germans seem to be telling the historical observer something 
about the necessities of mobile warfare in the desert. 
The Germans inserted their Pak units in combat with a style 
illustrated by the following combat action. In full withdrawal 
by mid-December 1941 after the Crusader battles, Rommel and his 
staff organized Kampfgruppe Menny as a strong rear guard 
I h 
47. Pz. AOK Africa, .o.ou., Vesorgungssac~ebijt, Best~nd um Pak, 
25.5.42, U.S., Archives, German Record, Panzere Armies, T-313, 
Roll 439, Fr. 873031. 
48. Pz. AOK Africa, o.ou., Versorgungssachgebiet, Funkspruch vom 
21.5.42, 13.20 Uhr, OKH/Gen St d H, Org. Abt. (III) an Pz AOK, 
U.S., Archives, German Records, Panzer Armies, T-313, Roll 439, 
fr. 8732968. 
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to prevent the encirclement and destruction of the remaining 
forces of the Panzer Army. The Germans combined the panzer 
n~k 
regiments of 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions to form aAtank force 
of 34 combat ready tanks - - the entire number of combat ready 
German tanks in North Africa - - and built the Kampfgruppe around 
them. Other elements included one battalion of 33rd Artillery 
Regiment, 2nd Machine Gun Battalion, part of 1st Battalion, 33rd 
(Army) Flak Regiment, and 3rd Company, 33rd Antitank Battalion. 
At this moment, 15 December 1942, a British force had moved 
around the south flank of the Panzer Army into positions between 
the Italian XXIst and XXth Army Corps threatening to break up the 
Panzer Army and block the retreat of Italo-German forces posi-
tioned to the east. Kampfgruope Menny had the mission to destroy 
this British force ensconced around height 181 which lay 15km 
west of Gazala. The 12 somm Pak of 3rd Company, 33rd Antitank 
Battalion fought in this action. 
Oberleutnant (First Lieutenant) Tocue, the Pak commander, 
placed himself and one platoon of four 50mm Pak with the leading 
elements of the machine gun battalion, deployed one additional 
platoon on the flank of the battalion, and ~et the remaining 
platoon on the right flank of the panzer force. Rather amazingly 
for an antitank gun commander, Tocue described his mission to 
include destruction of enemy ground targets "as well as especial-
ly to suppress enemy Pak, machine gun positions, etc., with high 
explosive shells and to furnish fire support for the attacking 
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infantry. 1149 Given the dangerous operational situation for the 
Panzer Group, Kampfqruppe Menny attacked with determination and 
in a short, intense battle essentially annihilated the dangerous-
ly positioned British force. Oberleutnant Tocue noted in detail 
the eclectic success achieved by the tactically flexible German 
Pak force. The 50mm Pak knocked out one heavy armored reconnais-
sance vehicle, two Mark IV cruiser tanks, one artillery tractor 
n 
"shot up in flames," four 40mm self-propelled antitank guns, 'ine 
trucks shot up also in flames and 12 additional damaged trucks 
set on fire by the Pak crews. Tocue noted specifically that his 
guns destroyed (or captured after the action) 30-40 British 
machine guns in the "very numerous machine gun nests" though use 
of high explosive shells. 50 In additional convincing detail, he 
noted that one of the British Mark IV cruiser tanks that he 
claimed for his company had in fact been immobilized by some 
other German weapon but was still firing and was finished off by 
a direct hit by a 50mm Pak AT round low on the hull. The anti-
tank gun crews also brought in 234 prisoners including seven 
officers out of the British positions which had been physically 
overrun by the Germans. From the viewpoint of weapons effects, 
he noted finally that the two British 87.6mm field guns claimed 
by him had been knocked out by direct hits with AT rounds and 
resultant wounding (but not killing) of the crews. 
9 
49. 15.Pz.D., Ia, KTB Nr. 2, Gefechtsbericht, 3./Pz.JI. 33, 
15.12.42, U.S., Archives, German Records, Divisions, T-313, Roll 
666, Fr. 000521. 
50. Ibid., Fr. 000522. 
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one more combat action should suffice to illustrate the 
flexible handling of German antitank gun units in the desert and 
the potential application to desert war today. Early in the 
crusader battles on 21 November 1941, 15th Panzer Division con-
tinued to search in a southwest direction from Sidi Azeiz for 
strong British tank forces operating deep in the rear of Panzer 
Group Africa and heading for Tobruk. The division commander 
deployed two companies of 33rd Pak Battalion, the organic Pak 
battalion of the division, on the flanks of the 115th Motorized 
Infantry Regiment in tactical march column behind the leading 8th 
Panzer Regiment. The division commander assigned the remaining 
1st Company, 33rd Pak Battalion, to a separate Kampfgruppe Major 
Obere1t formed for another mission. War is filled with friction, 
however, and 1st Company lost Kampfgruppe Oberent in the darkness 
of the evening of 20-21 November and at break of day was assigned 
to secure the right flank of 115th Motorized Infantry Regiment 
behind 2d Company already deployed there. The motorized infantry 
regiment advanced westward seeking contact with the British. 
As the march continued, strong British armored reconnais-
sance forces began to move in from the south, and the commander, 
115th Motorized Infantry Regiment shifted the 2nd and 3rd Compa-
nies, 33rd Pak Battalion, to screen the regiment's south flank. 
In an instructive lesson in the fluid nature of desert war, the 
Pak battalion commander took over the two Pak companies and moved 
them 3km farther south into what he described as the best firing 
positions according to the lie of the land. As the two Pak 
companies moved into the firing positions, they found themselves 
engaged by large numbers of British armored reconnaissance vehi-
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cles which they checked momentarily by "shooting up in flames" 
two accompanying trucks. The two Pak companies continued to 
engage the British while the motorized rifle regiment already 3km 
distant continued. to march west. The Pak battalion commander 
decided to break contact with the British but continue to screen 
the regiment's south flank by "leap frogging" his two companies 
from firing position to firing position parallel with the advance 
of the regiment. Acting according to this plan, 3rd Pak Company 
"limbered up" and moved west into new positions. As 2nd Pak 
Company attempted to break contact with the British and leap frog 
forward it found itself strafed and bombed by part of a force of 
20 British Hurricane fighter-bombers attacking the south flank of 
the motorized infantry regiment. 51 
Approximately an hour later, at 1100 22 November 1941, the 
motorized rifle regiment slowed and halted in the face of strong 
British tank forces and a major battle began to take shape. The 
1st Pak company had continued to move on the north flank of 115th 
Motorized Rifle and as strong contact developed with the enemy, 
the Pak commander, Lieutenant Walters, on his own in.i tia ti ve 
advanced to the point of the regiment and went into the best 
firing positions he could find. The tactical situation seems 
unreal; a Pak company in position alone as the most advanced 
front of a motorized rifle regiment. The company observed Brit-
ish tank forces massing for an attack about 1,200m away and 
51. 15.Pz.D, Ia, Anlage zum KTB Nr. 2, Pz Jg. 33, Gefechtsbericht 
ueber die Abwehr f eindlicher Panzerangriff e gegen die Suedf lanke 
der 15.Pz. - Div. am 22.11.1941, U.S., Archives, German Records, 
Divisions, T-313, Roll 666, Fr. 000378.79. 
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knocked out one of several tanks which had moved closer to the 
front of the motorized rifle regiment. At this juncture, midaft-
ernoon, strong German tank forces moved out from the front of the 
tn ,,f (Jf"! z el N f I e 
Aregiment through the 12 50mm Pak cannons of the company and 
engaged the British tank force. After tank-verus-tank combat, 
the German tanks short of fuel and ammunition broke contact with 
the British and rolled back toward the front of the motorized 
rifle regiment and through the Pak of the company. Sensing an 
advantage, the British tanks pressed forward and ran up against 
the advanced Pak screen. The Pak guns had lain largely undetect-
ed by the British for what they were - - part of a full-strength 
company well deployed in good firing positions. The company 
commander opened "surprise fire" with all 12 guns simultaneously 
when a large number of the advancing British tanks were at aoom 
range. The company commander observed that one tank immediately 
burst into flames and others stopped with smoke pouring from 
them. 52 The British halted their advance and engaged the Pak 
cannons with tank cannon and machine gun fire. When darkness 
fell, the Pak company still lay in its firing positions .. 
This historical incident can be used to make some important 
generalizations about war in the desert and the German style of 
fighting it. There is a frontless quality about war in the 
desert between two motorized opponents. The ~otorized rifle 
regiment moved long distances through open desert hunting for an 
equally mobile opponent but unable to locate him. There is a 
52. Ibid., Fr. 000379. 
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long range quality about desert war. Endangered by an enemy 
lying somewhere to the south, the motorized infantry regimental 
commander did not secure his flank with a motorized infantry 
company but rather with two antitank gun companies. The infantry 
company did not have enough weapons with long enough range to 
keep a strong motorized opponent from closing with and destroying 
it. In desert war, the tactical realities are far different from 
those in hilly country with vegetation and built up areas. The 
antitank gun battalion commander set up his screen of guns 3km 
off the flank of the motorized infantry regiment whose commander 
continued to advance away from the guns. 
of the flanks of the antitank gun line? 
What about the security 
What about the expanding 
several- kilometers-wide gap between the motorized rifle regiment 
and the Pak companies? 
The following factors seem to explain apparently ill 
considered and dangerous tactical moves. In open, level desert, 
motorized forces in movement cannot be concealed in daylight. 
The relatively large (compared with men) vehicles can be seen 
when moving and often raise clouds of dust that can be seen even 
farther. The regimental commander in the incident above could 
see from the flank of the regiment that the gap between the Pak 
and the infantry was empty and knew that the Pak companies had 
long range weapons that could dominate large areas of the gap in 
the event a maneuvering enemy force appeared in it. In contrast, 
in open, "level" desert, a motorized force like the 1st Pak 
Company that had moved to the front of the motorized infantry 






deployed stationary in its firing positions virtually disappeared 
in the desert. 
German Tactics in the Desert: 
Tank Retrieval and Repair in Combat 
The strength of the DAK on a particular day of the war in 
Africa lay in the number of tanks ready for combat. The number 
of combat ready tanks depended, in turn on the original number 
available for action and attrition through (1) tanks totally 
lost, and (2) tanks temporarily lost and in process of retrieval, 
evacuation, repair, and return to action. The DAK had no tank 
reserves and in the relatively brief Crusader battles received no 
replacement tanks through the supply line to Africa. The OAK 
began the Crusader battles with 260 battle, reconnaissance, and 
command tanks and with that number comprised a mobile force 
capable with skill and reasonable luck of defeating the much 
larger British tank forces. Separately from tactical skill, 
however, the DAK would win, survive, or be annihilated as a 
combat force based on how many of that original number of tanks 
it would continue to have available for battle. 
The Germans lost tanks in combat in the desert from causes 
that included combat (gunfire, mines, etc.), terrain hazards, and 
mechanical breakdown. The balances among these causes could be 
surprising and it is worthwhile to understand the realities of 
this situation in order to come to grips with an important part 
of mobile war. In Korea, for example, from 1950-53, the United 
Nations forces lost more tanks to "terrain hazards" than they did 
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to enemy action. The difficult terrain for tanks and the lack of 
mobile warfare largely explain the observed result. In the 
desert in 1941-42, the Germans lost tanks mainly to gunfire from 
British tanks and antitank guns, but they also suffered signifi-
cant losses from mechanical breakdown. The following distinc-
tions help in the understanding of the tank strength of mobile 
forces at any point in time: 
Tank "Losses" During Combat* 
Tanks Lost (Combat)(Gunfire, Mines, etc.) Tanks Lost (Non-Combat) 
1. Catastrophic Kill - Perm. Loss 1. Terrain Hazard - Perm. Loss 
2. Immobilization - Perm. Loss 2. Terrain Hazard 
-
Temp. Loss 
3. Immobilization - Temp. Loss 3. Mech. Breakdown - Perm. Loss 
4. Firepower Damage - Temp. Loss 4. Mech. Breakdown - Temp. Loss 
*Perm. or permanent. Temp. or temporary. Mech. or mechanical. 
The listing shows that mobile forces in combat can expect 
daily to suffer "losses" that can be characterized as either 
permanent or temporary. The listing suggests thereby that the 
permanent losses cannot be retrieved during critical, brief 
periods of high intensity combat by resupply and are particularly 
devastating. The listing also suggests that losses can be re-
turned to combat by a process of retrieval and repair that is a 
uniquely important factor in mobile operations. 
In the period 18 November-7 December 1941, the OAK faced a 
situation in which it would attempt to conduct a great German 
mobile operation with its original striking power as intact as 
possible but would be ground down in battle by tank losses char-
acterized as permanent or temporary. The OAK would begin to 
suffer numbers of tanks totally lost and have to take steps to 
keep those numbers as low as possible. The Germans could not do 
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much about the catastrophic destruction of their tanks by gun-
fire, mines, etc .. They were constrained by the existing designs 
of the vehicles and the realities of the armed violence of com-
bat. In the category of total loss, however, the Germans lost 
most of their vehicles to retrieval problems on the battlefield. 
Typically, panzer forces would observe immobilized German tanks 
at the end of engagements lying irretrievable on British ground. 
On their own ground, unless the tanks were burning, the Germans 
would tow immobilized vehicles immediately with the tractors of 
. 0 . . the tank repair company (PanzerwerkstattkJllpanie) organic to each 
I\ 
panzer regiment. Repairable tanks would then be evacuated to the 
workshops of the organic repair company. In some cases, the 
Germans would move the repair companies to concentrations of 
tanks in process of evacuation. The Germans suffered many tanks 
as total losses because they were unable to retrieve them off the 
battlefield as soon as they were immobilized in German-held 
territory. The retrieval "battle" fought above was one of the 
most important in the mobile engagements of 1941-42. 
The OAK would also begin to suffer numbers of tanks immobi-
lized through combat damage, terrain hazard, and mechanical 
breakdown during combat and remaining on ground under German 
control. In these incidents of tanks immobilized but capable of 
repair, the Germans had to evacuate the vehicles on tank trans-
port vehicles as quickly as possible to the repair companies for 
work and return to combat. If the tanks could be repaired in two 
days shop time, the Germans did the work in the maintenance 
companies and returned the tank to the panzer regiments as die-
tated by the tactical situation. Tanks requiring more than two-
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days work were evacuated to Army-level workshops farther to the 
rear. Once in that cycle of evacuation, the German tanks had 
little chance of return to combat in a fight of the duration of 
the crusader battles. 
During Crusader, the Germans fought the following "battle" 
of retrieval and repair. With 124 tanks on 17 November 1941, 5th 
Panzer Regiment, 21st Panzer Division, suffered its first losses 
on 19 November. on that day the panzer regiment lost two tanks 
catastrophically killed by British gunfire and six others lost 
permanently through other damage or loss mechanisms. By the end 
of the day, 22 November 1941, the panzer regiment had suffered 
permanent losses of 24 tanks including five catastrophically 
killed by gunfire and 19 permanently lost mostly as damaged 
vehicles unable to be moved during forced shifts of the panzer 
regiment's repair workshops, or left behind at damaged- tank 
concentration areas in the cut and thrust of the mobile battle. 
On 23 November, 5th Panzer Regiment fought its biggest battle of 
the operation with a substantial number of tanks - - approximate-
ly 80 ready for combat. The 5th Panzer Regiment scor.ed along 
with the tank regiment of the other panzer division, the biggest 
German victory in the Crusader battles and one that brought them 
close to victory in the whole operation. The panzer regiment 
t.U 
suffered heavy losses that day though that ranAf?llows: 17 tanks 
catastrophically killed by gunfire or permanently lost through 
other means, 51 tanks temporarily damaged and under repair 
(including a substantial number from previous days' actions), and 
32 tanks ready for insertion in combat. The remaining striking 
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power of Panzer Group Africa can be equated with those 32 tanks 
and a somewhat larger number in the other German panzer regiment 
in North Africa. Rommel would practice operational art on the 
morning of 24 November 1941 constrained by the offensive capabil-
ities of that small remaining number of German tanks in North 
Africa. 
German tactics for tank retrieval included the aggressive 
towing of vehicles under fire. The Germans developed these 
tactics in order to prevent the capture or destruction of friend-
ly tanks occasioned by the sudden and significant shifts in loca-
tion by opposing forces in the desert. The Germans pushed their 
regimental tank repair company as far forward as possible to 
reduce evacuation and return times. it is difficult to exagger-
ate the importance of these tactics because of the direct corre-
lation between the number of tanks in Panzer Group Africa and the 
operational possibilities open to its commander. The Germans did 
these things well, for example, note the total of 51 tanks having 
been successfully retrieved off the battlefield and evacuated to 
the regimental tank workshops by the evening of 23 November by a 
single regiment. In contrast, the Germans had permanently lost 
41 additional tanks including 23 tanks left behind due to chance 
shifts in the mobile battle and resultant overrunning by the 
British. 
After the Crusader battles, 5th Panzer Regiment, 21st Panzer 
Division, put together a report of its battles in the period 17 
November-31 December 1941. In the report, the regimental 
commander painstakingly pieced together the picture in tank 
losses suffered during the high intensity mobile battles. The 
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Germans provide a valuable picture of the distribution of losse~ 
by various causes and the importance of the tank retrieval anc 
repair company in armored combat. 
following: 53 
The picture was the 
No. 








Description of Loss 
Gunfire: Burned or Completely Destroyed. 
Gunfire or Mech Breakdown: Some Permanently Lost 
Others Successfully Retrieved. 
Immobilized. No Tow Available. Blown Up in 
Place. 
Unknown Fate./'~ 
Immobilized. Towed to Repair Companies Both 
Panzer R.tS. Then Abandoned During Tactical 
Displacements. 
Immobilized. Towed to First Assembly Area. 
Then Abandoned During Tactical Withdrawal. 
92 Tanks Damaged Out of Original 124 in Tank Regt. 
For the Marine Corps today, the listing gives a rough idea 
of the distribution of losses that could be expected in a high 
intensity armored engagement in the desert. Even more usefully, 
the listing shows the importance of battlefield retrieval in 
maintaining numbers of tanks and armored reconnaissance vehicles 
and similar armored combat vehicles in the category of "ready for 
insertion in battle." The Germans also suffered painful losses 
due to displacements of the tank repair companies and the aban-
donment of the initial assembly area for retrieved tanks. The 
5th Panzer Regiment permanently lost the staggering total of 28 
tanks through its displacements compared for example with the 
53. 15.Pz.D., Ia, Anlage zum KTB Nr. 2, Gefechtsbericht ... des 
Panzer-Regiments 5 vom 17.11.bis 31.12.41, U.S., Archives, German 
Records, Divisions, T-313, Roll 767, Fr. 000234. 
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permanent loss of only 17 tanks in the biggest engagement of the 
Crusader operation on 23 November 1941 around Sidi Rezegh. Tank 
retrieval has always been known to be a serious business. The 
German experience indicates that it is so important that special 
tactics and techniques are necessary to be developed to secure 
the position of groupment~ of tanks lying in retrieval assembly 
areas and in the tank workshops themselves. 
The Commander, 5th Panzer Regiment came to the conclusion 
that the Retrieval Platoon of the Repair and Retrieval Company 
needed radios and security combat vehicles to reduce the losses 
to salvageable vehicles. This experienced commander pointed out 
also that higher headquarters must assure a secure basis for the 
retrieval of damaged armored vehicles, for example a secure area 
for the assembly of the vehicles away from the immediate battle-
field. He noted also that the motorized rifle regiment must be 
tasked to provide a reserve combat force to protect the damaged 
but repairable tanks of the panzer regiment and to secure the 
retrieval platoon during towing off the battlefield. 
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CHAPTER 4 
GERMAN LOGISTICS IN THE DESERT 
Rommel and the Germans in North Africa conducted militar1 
operations that had one striking similarity to the great alliec 
amphibious campaigns of World War II in both the European and 
Pacific theaters. Panzer Army Africa depended almost entirely or. 
sea lanes of communication between Italy and North Africa. The ff 
German Luftwa .. e supplemented those lines by flying all of its 
I 
aircraft and most of its personnel to Africa and carried eventu-
ally most of the German Army personnel that moved between Italy 
and Africa as replacements and evacuated wounded. Rommel and his 
staff practiced extensive coordination with the large Italian and 
small German naval forces responsible for seaborne logistics. 
Rommel faced operational disaster in the Crusader battles because 
of the breakdown of the sea lines of communication in the months 
prior to the British offensive. 
With the importance of seaborne logistics demonstrated by 
November 1941, Rommel and his staff, and the High Commands of 
Italy and Germany took steps when they were strong in the Medi-
terranean in the first half of 1942, to secure the logistics of 
the Panzer Army. German supplies flowed freely during that 
period. Rommel was able to supply his forces by sea more effec-
tively than the British. As a result, he was able to put togeth-
er forces strong enough to conduct offensive operations around 
Gazala in eastern Libya in May-June 1942 with the strategic goal 
to defeat the British field army. With its defeat, the Italo-
German forces planned to continue the axis strategic offensive by 
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the knowiedge of Malta and resultant securing of the sea lines of 
communication to Libya. Based on the extent of the defeat of the 
British field army, the Germans also had the alternate option to 
continue the attack into Egypt with the remote but tempting 
possibility of driving the British out of North Africa immediate-
ly. In the actual event, Rommel demanded the continuation of the 
drive into Egypt. In spite of his unique brilliance in seizing 
chance opportunity and maintaining a fierce tempo of operations, 
he was unable to advance beyond Alamein. Two factors largely 
explain his failure - - the continued general weakness of his sea 
lines of communication which limited the strength of the Panzer 
Army just below that necessary to push on to Alexandria and the 
chance British seizure of a Germ.an enigma coding machine in 1934 
and the eventual capability to read high level German message 
traffic during WW II. 
Ashore, in Libya, within the Panzer Army, the Germans 
organized effective logistics operations. Under the German Army 
system, the Panzer Army held the Service Troops and delivered 
supplies into dumps at corps level in support of the divisions. 54 
Each German division had an organic Service Echelon that paral-
leled the Panzer Army Service Troops. The 21st Panzer Division, 
for example, had one division-level panzer workshop company while 
54. The Germ.an term, supply, included all the supporting services 
associated today with the more fashionable term, logistics. The 
researcher will use the term, service, for the rest of the chap-
ter to include the provision of rations, fuel, ammunition, the 
maintenance and repair of weapons and equipment, the preparation 
of food, the providing of medical treatment, etc .. 
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the Panzer Army had a similar company with capabilities to accom-
plish higher levels of repair. The division would also have two 
ambulance companies, two medical companies, and a division hospi-
tal. The Panzer Army in turn had several higher level hospitals 
- - two army, one field, and one war hospitals - - - to which the 
division evacuated casualties as appropriate to the wound, road 
conditions, and distances. For the Germans fighting a mobile 
war, however, the service challenge in supplying a battle was 
provision of fuel, ammunition, and water and rations. In the 
21st Panzer Division, the commander had at his disposal the 
division Nachschubdienst (Supply Service), a battalion level 
organization also often referred to as the division Trosse 
(trains) for resupply. In the German division of World War II, 
the division Ib, or quartermaster, normally a general staff 
officer, directed the resupply in the name of the division com-
mander. The Ib accomplished this resupply largely through the 
columns and companies of the division trains and orders issued to 
the commander of the trains. 
In 15th Panzer Division, the division commander provided 
service support for the division through means of his Ib and the 
trains organized as sketched out in Figure 3. The Figure, which 
has been extracted directly from a division order on organiza-
tion, shows the Ib with a Quartermaster Echelon co-located with 
the commander and "staff" of the division trains. The Ib resup-
plied the division largely through 13 numbered columns each with 
a 30-ton capacity in appropriate supplies. Columns 8-10, for 
example, carried fuel, one numbered column carried water (Was-
ser); and another unnumbered column (Ers. or Ersatz) carried 
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replacement tanks. The division trains also included three 
automotive repair companies with capabilities to handle both 
wheeled and tracked vehicles. The number of trucks in a 30-ton 
column varied according to the capacities of the trucks-used. 55 
Most commonly, the Germans put together the columns with ten 
vehicles. With the columns, the Germans had a resupply system 
that was redundant and flexible with what can be likened to 
interchangeable transportation building blocks. 
In a panzer division, the Ib co-located the Quartermaster 
Echelon with the commander and "staff" of the division trains in 
order to be in touch with the actual situation in fuel and 
ammunition, and intervene as necessary to maintain resupply. As 
such, he often found himself with lightly armed service troops, 
e.g., drivers and assistant drivers of the numerous trucks in the 
division trains and personnel of the workshop companies. With a 
significant concentration of vehicles in a theater where the 
enemy had a strong air force, the Ib in 15th Panzer Division had 
a little Kampfstaffel with 8 20mm Flak for defense against low 
level air attack for both the quartermaster staff personnel and 
the parts of the division trains often around the headquarters. 
The Ib faced another even more dangerous characteristic of war-
fare in the desert in the ultra-mobility of the opposing forces. 
The British in the crusader battles advanced with several hundred 
armored reconnaissance vehicles, truck-borne infantry, and large 
55. Capacities of different columns varied from division to 
division; for example, 21st Panzer Division at approximately the 
same time (6 Feb 42), had only one fuel column but with a capaci-










numbers of tanks. Formed into numerous battle detachments large 
and small that often freely roamed the open desert in a frontless 
mobile war, they constituted potentially mortal datger in sudden, 
chance encounter with the Ib, the commander of the trains, or 
individual columns. 
For its own protection and for the defense of the commander 
of the trains and the trains themselves, the Quartermaster Eche-
lon had six truck-towed 37mm Pak in addition to the 8 . 20mm Flak 
weapon~. The Ib personally deployed a force that could fight off 
fairly strong British units on the move in chance encounters. 
The 37mm Pak was a marginal weapon against the British cruiser 
tanks at ranges over soom, but, at shorter ranges, its projec-
tiles would perforate the armor of the numerous older cruisers 
°'tJ>rox1m&tfe/y 40m"" 
with their frontal protection of,1 •t• and lighter armor else-
where. With its armor piercing shells, the 37mm Pak could easily 
knock out the British armored reconnaissance vehicles at longer 
ranges, and, with its high explosive shells, it was effective 
against trucks, infantry, various infantry weapons, and antitank 
guns. The Ib could use the 20mm Flak in a ground firing role 
against the British armored reconnaissance vehicles and knock 
them out with the two types of antitank ammunition developed for 
the weapon - - the conventional AT round and the tungsten-cored 
AT round. German test firings showed that the antitank rounds 
had similar performance at 500m range56 with armor perforation of 
about 17.Smm at 30 degrees angle of obliquity. These figures 
56. Pz. AOK Africa, o.ou., Versorgungssachgebiet, OKH, Gen Std H, 
Nr.: Il984/41 g. Kdos., 28.2.41, U.S. Archives, German Records, 
Panzer Armies, T-313, Roll 439, Fr. 8732892. 
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translate into knocking out armored reconnaissance vehicles at 
ranges somewhat over 500m. At shorter ranges of approximately 
100-200m, the 20mm Flak could perforate the frontal armor of the 
early British cruiser tanks with low obliquity impacts over wide 
areas of the sides. The 20mm Flak also had high explosive pro-
jectiles that were particularly effective against trucks. 
The Germans recognized the detached and exposed situation of 
the division quartermaster and the trains and provided him with a 
Kampf staffel (battle echelon) to def end the quartermaster echelon 
and the trains near it. For the fluid combat situations of 
mobile war in the desert the Germans were on the right track. 
The quartermaster Kampf staff el should probably have been even 
larger so that the Ib could send out escort forces with columns 
when required and def end the division workshop companies from 
disastrous displacements and the abandonment of crucial weapons 
forced sometimes by relatively small British forces. The Germans 
should probably have increased the Kampfstaffel to include an 
infantry platoon reinforced by medium mortars and machine guns 
and as many captured weapons as could be put together convenient-
de11e /op 
ly. The 15th Panzer Di vision had begun to - CL LL.LU - a di vision 
trains organization with an integral combat force strong enough 
to fight off enemy mobile forces, escort its more important 
columns, and form strong points for self defense. 
By February 1942, Panzer Anny Headquarters, concerned by the 
harassment of supply columns by light British forces and by a 
relatively small numbers of British-recruited Arab franc tireurs 
(guerrillas), put out orders that required a driver and assistant 
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driver in every supply truck on the move individually or ir 
columns. The Panzer Army required that the two men in ever~ 
truck each have a firearm specifically loaded and accessible foz 
action. For each column of the supply trains on the move, Panzez 
Army orders required a security troop armed specifically with 
n . 
automatic weapons and h~ grenades in addition to the rifles or 
pistols of the drivers and assistant drivers. Sensitive to air 
attack, the Germans specifically designated members of the secu-
rity troops as Spaeher (or, ~ outs) for British low level 
aircraft and mobile ground forces. 57 
In May-June 1942, Rommel conducted the Venezia operation, 
orchestrating three separate battles toward the strategic goal of 
the destruction of the British field army lying between Gazala 
and Tobruk. With the German plan revealed to the British in 
advance through the Ultra situation, Rommel faced a difficult 
operation that lasted longer than expected and was characterized 
by an extremely complex crisscrossing of opposing combat forma-
tions. He also experienced a disastrously dangerous situation 
for the almost unarmed German supply columns terribly exposed in 
the middle of the deep enemy defense system and harassed by 
British light troops operating out of the desert from the south. 
With the service support situation near collapse, he issued the 
57. For these developments see Pz.AOK Africa, Ia, Anlaqe zum KTB 
Nr. 3, Pz-AOK Abt. Ia/Ic Nr. 1210/42 g . , Ueberfaelle, 28.2.42., 
U.S., Archives, German Records, Panzer Armies, T-313, Roll 426, 
Fr. 8719301, 02. 
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following order on 31 May 1942, in the middle of the great opera-
tion: 
"All service support columns and supply convoys are to 
attach the fundamentally necessary antitank weapons for self 
defense. Further, all supply convoys are to be outfitted with 
radio communications by which means they can be 5~corted by radio 
and be in a position to request prompt support." 
Rommel issued this order in the early stages of the Venezia 
operation while deeply embedded in the British Gazala defenses. 
At that moment, he and his mobile force depended for their sur-
vival on supplies moved by truck columns. The truck columns of 
the German divisions, for example, had to move from the combat 
areas of their divisions back to OAK dumps to pick up supplies 
and deliver them forward to the combat units and division dumps. 
Panzer Army truck columns simultaneously delivered supplies to 
the OAK dumps and constituted additional logistics traffic in the 
rear area. In the first two days of the offensive, Rommel hoped 
to have roads opened through the British minefields and past the 
fortified British boxes directly into the mobile force. Unable 
initially to get through the British minefields or reduce the 
static defense positions, the Panzer Army depended on extended 
roads for their truck columns south of the British defenses 
around Bir Hachein which held out until 11 June 1942. The situa-
tion was chaotic with the German divisional truck columns and 
even Panzer Army truck columns farther to the rear under attack 
by British armored reconnaissance forces and various other raid-
ing detachments. The German truck columns once among their own 
58. Pz. AOK Afrika, Ia, Anlage zum KTB, Panzerarmee Afrika Ia, 
Gef. St., den 31.5.42. Takt.Zeit. 2235, U.S., Archives, German 
Records, Panzer Armies, T-313, Roll 469, Fr. 8766866. 
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